

COUNTERSpy

The Magazine For People Who Need To Know

Volume 4, Number 2

\$2

Spring 1980

CIA COPS IN EL SALVADOR

AFRICANS AND RIGGS BANK IN SOUTH AFRICA

by Kojo Arthur

CIA AND LABOR IN TURKEY

by John Kelly

US-AUSTRALIAN ROLE IN EAST TIMOR GENOCIDE

by Denis Freney

CIA INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

by Konrad Ege

CIA IN AMERICA

by John Kelly

Editorial

On July 11, 1941, before the U.S. entered World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Coordination of Information (COI) Office - the first "CIA".

According to the official Office of Strategic Services (OSS) history, by Kermit Roosevelt, "The order (creating the COI), however, was not to be specific as to the functions of the new agency; both the President and (William J.) Donovan agreed that, in the delicate situation then existing, it would be preferable to have no precise definition appear".

The order establishing the COI was not only imprecise, but consciously deceptive. It charged the COI to "carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national security not now available to the Government".

Again, Kermit Roosevelt commented on the deliberate vagueness of the order's intent: "Only the few who had been initiated in Donovan's ideas and concepts and his conferences with the President and the Cabinet committee realized the importance of the phrase."

The importance of the wording was, in Donovan's mind, that it allowed him and the COI to do just about anything that accorded with his personal definition of national security.

The CIA, maintaining the COI's intentionally obscure phrase, has been doing whatever it pleases under bogus authorizations of this kind, new laws notwithstanding.

For this reason, CounterSpy sees no point in expending efforts to "reform" or "restrain" the CIA through legislation. The CIA has never concerned itself with the law, even when its own investigators uncovered violations. As former CIA official, James J. Angleton once told Congress: "It's inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all the overt orders of the government."

Given the CIA's disregard of the law and its enormous record of consciously committed crimes it is folly, at best,

to talk of reforming the CIA. The only acceptable, humane response is to work for the abolition of the CIA.

Accordingly, CounterSpy, as we have stated in the past, fully supports the abolition of the CIA.

This is not to say that to work with Congress is pointless. It is important to prevent the passage of laws desired by the CIA such as those restricting the Freedom of Information Act and the publication of information about CIA operations and personnel. Public exposure of the activities and crimes of the CIA is the only legal means for protection from, and possibly restraint of, the CIA.

Thus, CounterSpy urges everyone to work to prevent passage of laws presently being considered, which would seriously cripple progressive publications. Those who are able, should contribute money, labor, and skills to progressive publications whose very existence is under determined attack by the CIA.

CONTENTS

CIA COPS IN EL SALVADOR	
.....	p. 3
AFRICANS AND RIGGS BANK IN SOUTH AFRICA	
by Kojo Arthur	p. 4
CIA AND LABOR IN TURKEY	
by John Kelly	p. 6
US-AUSTRALIAN ROLE IN EAST TIMOR GENOCIDE	
by Denis Freney	p. 10
CIA INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN	
by Konrad Ege	p. 22
CIA IN AMERICA	
by John Kelly	p. 39

CIA COPS IN EL SALVADOR

When the huge anti-government demonstrations took place in El Salvador in early 1980 against a U.S. backed regime, the people in the demonstrations were bombarded with teargas and other "non-lethal" weapons shipped in by the U.S. government "for the occasion". For a long time, Salvadorean police had also been trained under the now defunct U.S. Office of Public Safety (OPS) program.

The following Salvadorean police officers received special, CIA-directed training in the U.S. from 1963-74. Their courses included classes and training in Police Intelligence, Planning for Riot Control, Targets of Insurgency, Counter-insurgency Intelligence, Chemical Munitions, Explosives and Demolitions, and Crowd and Mob Psychology.

In addition, for the CIA, the OPS program served as an excellent field for recruitment and for extending the "CIA infrastructure" in El Salvador.

Jose Antonio Aguilar Mejia (in the U.S. from 9/74-12/74); Rigoberto Aguirre Leonor (6/68-8/68); Ramon Alfredo Alvarenga (5/73-6/73); Pedro Antonio Angel (7/70-8/70); Roberto Augustin Archila Ulloa* (2/69-4/69); Salvador Arias Ramos* (8/71-10/71); Pedro Antonio Artiga Henriquez (8/68-12/68); Ruben Avila Villalta (7/63-10/63); Carlos Angel Aviles Flores (4/63-7/63);

Justo Alfonso Ayala Alfaro (1/63-2/63); Guillermo Ayala Campos (8/69-11/69); David Ayala Mixoo (6/69-9/69); Luis Adalberto Ayala Tevez (7/63-10/63); Juan Antonia Baires Lopes (5/69-8/69); Jose Eugenio Barrera Lemus (4/72-8/72); Gonzalo Alberto Campos (4/69-8/69); Jose Antonio Castillo* (2/69-4/69); Jose Antonio Castillo (3/70-7/70); Victor Manuel Castro Garay (1/63-2/63);

Edgardo Alfonso Cea-Chavez (4/69-8/69); Candel Cisneros Urquilla (2/73-6/73); Virgilio Cortez (7/63-10/63); Julio Cesar Cortez* (4/67-8/67); Ricardo Alfonso Cruz Portillo (3/70-7/70); Adolfo Cuellar Martinez* (8/70-10/70); Miguel Angel Fabian* (8/71-10/71); Miguel Angel Flores (4/63-7/63); Jorge Ernesto Flores (5/73-6/73);

Jose Manuel Flores (8/73-12/73); Rafael Antonio Galvez Erazo (1/73-5/73); Juan Bautista Garay Flores (5/67-9/67); Alberto Garcia Alonso (3/70-7/70); Adan Garcia (4/63-7/63); Carlos Rene Garcia (10/69-2/70); Reginaldo de Jesus Garcia (6/69-10/69); Orlando Gomez Platero* (10/72-12/72); Jose Antonio Hidalgo Morales (7/63-10/63);

Alirio Enrique Huevo (5/73-8/73); Jose Nicolas Jimenez (7/63-10/63); Rene de Jesus Landaverde Torres (5/68-12/68); Jose Larios Guerra (8/69-11/69); Jose Angel Leiva (3/68-7/68); Joaquina Lopez Zapata (3/68-6/68); Serafin Lopez (7/63-10/63); Jose Adolfo Medrano Pacheco (1/63-2/63); Jose Alberto Medrano (6/69); Jose Raul Mejia (2/73-6/73);

Eugenio Arturo Melendez Bonilla (4/63-7/63); Jose Victor Menendez Guevara (8/68-12/68); Jose Nelson Merino Chavez (1/71-5/71); Jose Luis Mira (7/63-10/63); Jaime Mauricio Mojica Amaya (4/74-6/74); Jose Alberto Molina (1/73-5/73); Jose Efrain Salvador Monterrosa (7/63-10/63); Armando Noches Palacios (5/73-6/73); Jose Antonio Palacios Lovos (4/63-7/63);

Juan A. Palma (4/72-8/72); Jose Mauricio Palomo Paz (5/69-8/69); Jose Mauricio Palomo Paz (4/74-6/74); Juan Carlos Pena (12/67-4/68); Isidro Penate Valiente (7/67-11/67); Carlos Pereira Alvarenga (5/69-8/69); Carlos Santana Quinteros Andrade (7/63-10/63); Oscar Rank Altamirano (5/69-6/69) - he also attended courses at the FBI National Academy; Efrain Reales Guatemala (9/74-12/74); Eduardo Romero Castillo (7/63-10/63);

Rufino Solorzano Ramirez (10/69-3/70); Carlos Sosa Santos* (8/70-10/70); Roberto Mauricio Staben Perla (7/67-11/67); Juan Felix Urbina Gomez (5/69-8/69); Jose Maria Uribe Portan (5/68-12/68); Ricardo Valle Talavera (4/63-7/63); Jesus Alberto Vargas (4/72-7/72);

(* received special training in the use of explosives at the Border Patrol Offices (the "CIA Bomb School") in Los Fresnos, Texas)

Jose Luis Vasquez Cierra (7/63-10/63);
 Abel Antonio Velasco (7/63-10/63);
 Carlos Alejandro Zacapa (4/72-8/72);
 Jose Ramiro Zepeda (5/73-8/73).

AFRICANS AND RIGGS BANK IN SOUTH AFRICA

by Kojo Arthur

(Ed. note: Kojo Arthur works with the Africa Research and Publications Project in Trenton, N.J.)

When the ceasefire agreements for ensuring elections for majority rule in Zimbabwe were on the verge of possible collapse, Nigeria threatened to resort to arms to resolve the Zimbabwe problem. Nigeria's Minister for External Affairs warned that "Nigeria would return fire with fire if South Africa intervened militarily in the political transition in Zimbabwe".

It will be recalled that it was the flexing of muscles by Nigeria on the eve of the last Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka, Zambia that broke the back of Britain which then agreed to setting up the Lancaster Conference. Shortly before the Commonwealth Conference, Nigeria announced the nationalization of British Petroleum's (BP) oil operations in Nigeria. This act forced the British government led by Margaret Thatcher to rescind its decision to lift sanctions that had been imposed on Rhodesia's illegal minority regime of Ian Smith and Bishop Abel Muzorewa. The Lancaster Conference eventually led to a ceasefire agreement and elections as part of the political transition in Zimbabwe.

Nigeria, besides flexing its muscles, contributed material and financial support to the Southern African liberation struggles. Nigeria's External Affairs Minister, Professor Ishaya Audu has said that Nigeria has spent over \$40 million in aid to these liberation struggles. Moreover, Professor Audu has declared that

Nigeria would zealously guard the independence of Zimbabwe. Nigeria's support of the liberation struggles in Southern Africa is commendable.

Other African countries, for example the Frontline States, have also contributed immensely in various ways to bring victory to the Zimbabwe people.

Whilst commending the positive contributions of Nigeria and other African states to the liberation struggles in Southern Africa, one must point out some of the negative contributions that have helped prolong the liberation struggles. It is well known that countries like the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Central Africa Republic and Malawi have economic ties with apartheid South Africa. However, very little is known about the fact that a number of African and some Caribbean countries that are vocal in condemning racist South Africa have, through their Embassies, bank accounts with the Riggs National Bank in Washington, D.C.

One may wonder what is wrong with African and Caribbean Embassies in Washington doing business with Riggs? It is this. Riggs is the biggest commercial bank in Washington; it is also one of the major U.S. banks that provide investment funds in South Africa to support and perpetuate discrimination and human indignities there.

Between 1973 and 1976, Riggs provided loans totaling \$7.5 million to a brewery, a commercial bank, and two important state corporations. On December 13, 1973 Riggs granted a \$1 million loan to ISCOR for eleven years with a five-year grace period at 3/4 % interest rate. ISCOR is

a state corporation meeting 72 % of South Africa's iron and steel requirements. The development of an efficient, powerful iron and steel industry is a main component of the apartheid country's plans for achieving industrial and military self-sufficiency.

Another loan for \$ 1 million was granted by Riggs to ESCOM on January 17, 1974. ESCOM received two other loans on July 25, 1974 for \$ 1 million and on September 15, 1975 for \$ 2.5 million. ESCOM is the South African state-controlled and managed Electric Supply Commission which operates 21 power stations and provides over 86 % of the country's power needs. ESCOM is currently involved in an expansion plan intended to meet South Africa's growing energy needs. This plan includes construction of coal-fired, nuclear, and hydro-electric power stations.

Again in 1976 Riggs loaned \$ 1 million to South Africa Breweries and another \$ 1 million to Standard Bank of South Africa. Interest rates on all six South African loans ranged between 3/4 % and 7 1/4 %. (According to the D.C Bank Campaign, Riggs has granted loans and lines of credit to the Chilean military regime; the group further charges that Riggs practices local redlining. Riggs has granted mortgage money in a disproportionate share to home buyers in affluent neighborhoods in Washington.)

Almost at the same period Riggs made the South African loans, Nigeria had millions of dollars outstanding to its credit with Riggs. As of December 1977 for example, Nigeria had about \$ 52.7 million credit outstanding in her accounts at Riggs. Whereas Riggs was loaning millions of dollars to support South Africa in oppressing the African people of all Southern Africa, Nigeria received a loan of \$ 75,000 from the bank in June 1972 for a national electric power project.

Other African and Caribbean countries whose Embassies have accounts with Riggs include Egypt, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Jamaica, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia. The Embassy of Ghana received a \$ 2.5 million loan from Riggs on October 21, 1976 for a ten-year period at 1 % interest rate.

Two aspects of U.S. bank loans to South Africa have made them especially vital to maintaining white minority rule. First, the loans have come primarily during

periods in which South Africa has faced serious economic and political instability. After the 1973 Arab oil boycott, South Africa has had to pay continually spiralling prices for its imports, particularly oil. Recession in the U.S. and Europe (1974-75) also constricted South Africa's export markets. Moreover, the price of gold (South Africa's leading export commodity) at that time was below normal levels, reducing the country's ability to bring in foreign exchange. Plagued by these economic problems, South Africa looked toward foreign banks for a bail-out. Riggs loans to state corporations in South Africa provided such a bail-out.

The second aspect of the U.S. bank loans to the apartheid regime is that the recipients of these loans have generally been prominent institutions of the racist government. Commenting on the ability of the South African government to borrow from foreign banks, the Financial Mail stated a month after the Soweto uprising: "...a unique feature of the market has been the support of U.S. banks. Apparently more finance has come from this quarter than ever before." (7/2/76)

A list of recipients of these recent loans reads like a Who's Who of South African corporations. Nearly three-quarters of the total U.S. investment in South Africa are controlled by 12 major state corporations. These corporations include ISCOR (iron and steel industries), ESCOM (electricity and power), ARMSCOR (which has made South Africa virtually self-sufficient in production of all but the most sophisticated arms), SASOL I and II (making synthetic fuel from coal), Phosphate Development Corporation (FOSKOR), SAHRR (railways) and SANRACHEM (chemical industries). Beginning in the 1920's, these government corporations were established to ensure government authority over the most strategic sectors of the economy. The state corporations are among the largest economic enterprises in the country.

U.S. banks and corporations (e.g. IBM, General Electric, General Motors, Xerox, Tenneco, Texaco, Honeywell, Citibank, Chase Manhattan, etc.) rank high in terms of the foreign contribution to South Africa's economy. After Britain, the U.S. is the largest foreign investor in South Africa. U.S. banks have over \$ 2

billion in outstanding loans to South Africa, accounting for 33 % of all loan claims against the country. Thus, Riggs loans to South Africa are of special qualitative importance. It has been concentrated in major sectors of South Africa's economy that are dominated by a limited number of state corporations.

For Nigeria and other African and Caribbean countries to continue to transact business with Riggs National Bank is to undermine the efforts these countries have made in support of the national liberation struggles in Southern Africa. Just as American banks and corporations have helped to build and maintain apartheid through investing in South Africa, their disengagement can now assist in ending that system. Blacks within

South Africa, representing a broad political spectrum, have called for this action. The NAACP has come out for total withdrawal of U.S. companies. State legislatures have begun to express concern and take action - Madison, Wisconsin gives preference in bids to firms that do no business in South Africa. There are many other examples of disengagement.

What are the African and Caribbean countries doing to accelerate the disengagement process ? Nigeria particularly can flex her economic muscles more to get Riggs and other area banks (Maryland National, United Virginia and American Security and Trust) to discontinue bailing out South Africa. Nigeria can learn from its actions against BP.

CIA AND LABOR IN TURKEY

by John Kelly

The Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) began as a concrete expression of George Meany's support of the U.S. war in Vietnam. AAFLI opened its first regional office in Saigon. AAFLI money then began pouring into the hands of CIA agent Tran Quoc Buu, then head of the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CVT). Accordingly, "Buu and the CVT were the labor functionaries of the Thieu regime and the U.S. government, and the CVT purpose was to effectively break worker strikes and resistance".¹

AAFLI is a counterpart of the AFL-CIO's American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), described by former CIA officer, Philip Agee as a "CIA-controlled labor center financed through AID".² The President of AAFLI for many years was George Meany, the "principal CIA agent/collaborator for purpose of the CIA international labor operations".³ Meany's successor and AAFLI's present president is Lane Kirkland, who recently feted CIA agent, Jonas Savimbi of UNITA (Angola) at his home. The executive director of AAFLI since its inception has been Morris Paladino, formerly the "principal CIA

agent for control of the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (ORIT)".⁴

In recent years, there has been an influx of personnel from the CIA's AIFLD to AAFLI. These transfers have included: Isaac Barnes, Joseph Bermudez, Emanuel ("Slim") Boggs, Emilio Garza ("CIA agent for labor operations"⁵), Jack E. Goodwyn ("CIA contract agent"⁶), Kenneth P. Hutchinson (former director of the CIA/AIFLD Front Royal Institute), Thomas Miller, Richard Oulahan, Valentino B. Suazo, and Robert D. Wholey.

AAFLI's first Country Program Director (CPD) for Turkey was former U.S. State Department labor attache, Emanuel Boggs whom Agee described as a "suspected high ranking CIA asset"⁷. Boggs was also the former director of AIFLD's CIA-controlled Front Royal Institute, and he had served in Chile where AIFLD worked closely with the CIA.

Following Boggs as AIFLD/CPD in Turkey was Tom Miller. Miller had previously served in South Vietnam⁸ in conjunction with the CVT and its head, Tran Quoc Buu. Following Vietnam, Miller served in South Korea⁹ where workers'

"Next week begins what Mr. (Tom) Miller describes as the heart of the program, a two-week study of the 'dangers and safe-guards for democratic labor'. We (AIFLD) will use a case study approach to see what happened in Cuba, how it came about, and what steps might have been taken by unions to thwart it', says Mr. Miller. The teachers will be Cuban union leaders who fled when the Reds came to power."

Harold H. Brayman,
National Observer,
7/30/62

rights are non-existent and the so-called unions working with AAFLI are rife with KCIA agents.

AAFLI began its formal operations in Turkey following a Spring 1972 seminar attended by 44 "leaders" of the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (TURK-IS) and its affiliated unions.¹⁰ Arising from the seminar were AAFLI-directed conferences and training programs. Led initially by AAFLI economist, David Kaplan, the subject of these seminars were: "contract analysis; job analysis; job specifications and writing job descriptions; job evaluation and motion study; wage comparisons by industry and area; the living wage concept; reading a company financial report; productivity and production; and accounting procedures of state economic enterprises." ¹¹

While not surprising it is significant that AAFLI's training, given by capitalist economists, contains little relevance to the rank-and-file workers. There is no training in union organizing, in strike organizing, or in how to bring about just wages, sick leave, overtime pay, medical benefits, unemployment benefits, child care, or safe, sanitary working conditions. Nor is there ever training in how to research a company's records to see if its assets and profits are commensurate with workers' wages and benefits.

This pro-corporate nature of AAFLI belies its representation as a unionist's or worker's organization. At the same time, it brings out why AAFLI works with the CIA, because the CIA has always

worked primarily for U.S. corporations and the furtherance of monopoly capitalism.

In Turkey, AAFLI has worked primarily with TURK-IS although not with rank-and-file unionists but designated leaders. In the U.S., AFL-CIO leaders, such as Meany and Kirkland, have always ruled autocratically and never been elected by rank-and-file members. The AFL-CIO leadership through AAFLI in Turkey attempted to also create and maintain an elitist, labor aristocracy, more privileged than the rank-and-file. Naturally, this elitist minority is easier to manipulate, and, in turn, to be used to steer unions to support pro-corporate, and U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Again, it should be emphasized that the overwhelming majority of rank-and-file union members, as it is the case even in the U.S., do not know of the machinations of AAFLI or its manipulative attempts with its various leaders. Thus, the following exposition is not to cast aspersions on TURK-IS but rather to alert its members as to who is being courted and wooed by AAFLI, an arm of the CIA and U.S. corporations. This is vital information to rank-and-file unionists since under AAFLI/CIA influence and/or control their own union will facilitate their exploitation and denial of elementary workers' needs.

As mentioned, AAFLI launched its formal operations at a 1972 conference which was held from May 23-27 in Izmir, Turkey.¹² This conference was overseen by CIA collaborator Morris Paladino who described AAFLI "with special emphasis given to the Institute's Philippine research project".¹³ However, he did not mention that Filipino unionists in 1970 had exposed AAFLI's collaboration with the CIA in the Philippines.¹⁴

Prior to the 1972 conference, Paladino had visited Turkey in 1971. This is what he had to say, in part, about his visit:

"I was in Ankara during the terrorist activity and the declaration of martial law and was in almost daily contact with the principal leaders of TURK-IS." ¹⁵

Neither Paladino nor AAFLI expressed opposition to the declaration of martial law. AAFLI has never opposed martial law unless it interfered with AAFLI

operations. On the contrary, under martial law, AAFLI operations often flourish such as in South Korea. This fact exposes the hypocrisy of AAFLI as a workers' organization since workers' rights are all but non-existent under martial law; strikes are invariably outlawed. For AAFLI to expand its union activities under such conditions is a cruel hoax since it gives the impression of extensive servicing of, and concern about, workers' needs. But, these union activities are meaningless if a union cannot strike when it is necessary. Furthermore, AAFLI never pushes for strikes, no matter how oppressive the working conditions, in defiance of martial law.

It should also be noted that Paladino, like the CIA and oppressive governments, clumped together all opposition activities, which included labor dissent, in Turkey as "terrorist activities".

Despite his being named as a CIA agent in Agee's book, Paladino later was the guest speaker at the Tenth Statutory Congress of TURK-IS held April 12-18, 1976 in Ankara.¹⁶

At Paladino's side was then-TURK-IS president Halil Tunc whom AAFLI later brought to the U.S. along with Kutay Aksel to "meet personally with Paladino and George Meany."¹⁷ That same year (1977) Binali Jagison, then president, Turkish Agricultural Workers Union, and Fuat Alan, then president of the Turkish Municipal Workers Union were brought by AAFLI to the AFL-CIO's 12th Biennial Convention in Los Angeles (December 8-13), where they also met with Paladino.¹⁸ Visiting AAFLI's U.S. headquarters in 1977 were the following officials of TURK-METAL, the Turkish metalworkers union: Ergul Ozsahiner, Muammer Gur, I. Hakki Suren, Ali Tatarer, Fevzi Korkmaz, and Abdurrahman Unlu; as well as Metin Ogan, then TURK-IS International Affairs Department Director.¹⁹

The other AAFLI representative at the May 23-27, 1972 conference besides Paladino was David Kaplan, who was assisted by Dr. Toker Dereli, then professor of labor relations at the University of Istanbul. TURK-IS officials featured at the conference were Seyfi Demirsoy (president); Halil Tunc (general-secretary); Kaya Ozdemir (education secretary); and Ferit Azkara (education director).²¹

Following the May conference, a nation-

al AAFLI/TURK-IS research and data collection center was established under the stimulation of Emanuel Boggs.²² While this may be all well and good for the analysis and collection of collective bargaining contracts, it should be noted that in Chile, for one (where Boggs formerly served), AIFLD and its Chilean associates gathered innocent-seeming data on union members. Subsequent to the overthrow of President Allende, some of this data was used by DINA to target thousands of workers for reprisals and even executions.²³ Hence, Turkish workers had best beware of questionnaires which have been flowing out of the AAFLI/TURK-IS data center.

On August 20, 1975, AAFLI, in conjunction with TURK-IS, established the Ankara Region Consumer Cooperative Federation (Tukobirlik).²⁴ This was announced at a press conference given by Sadik Side (TURK-IS); Huseyin Polat (AAFLI coop specialist); Ethem Ezgu (TURK-IS); Turan Albayrak (Ankara Co-op Federation); Ibrahim Capan (KOOP-IS); and Cafer Yalniz (Ankara Co-op Federation). Organizations begun by AAFLI are of particular concern. In the field of agriculture, AAFLI has also worked closely with officials of TARIM-IS, the Turkish agricultural workers' union.²⁵

Following the establishment of Tukobirlik, AAFLI's Tom Miller and Frank Anastasio worked with its president, Huseyin Eksi and Mustafa Kundakci of the Izmir Highway Workers to stimulate the creation of the Izmir Regional Co-op Federation.²⁶ (Kundakci later conducted a TURK-IS/AAFLI training program for members of the Cement/Ceramic Workers Union in Izmir.²⁷)

Also in 1975, AAFLI, in "continuing its close cooperation with TURK-IS" sponsored a study tour in the U.S. for Huseyin Elbek (TURK-IS), Yalcin Gulpinar (Agricultural Workers Union), Emre Kocaoglu (Textile Workers National Union), and Ibrahim Uluc (Food, Tobacco, and Allied Workers National Union).²⁸ The four attended programs at the Wisconsin University School for Workers and the AFL-CIO Labor Studies Center in Washington, D.C.

In 1979, TURK-IS held its 11th Statutory Convention in Ankara which was attended by twenty foreign unionists including Morris Paladino and AFL-CIO

vice-president John O'Donnell.²⁹ At the convention, Ibrahim Denizcier replaced Halil Tunc as president.³⁰ Denizcier is the president and founder of the Food, Drink, and Tobacco Workers Union (Tekgida-Is). He has been in contact with AAFLI, specifically AAFLI representative Maida Kemp.³¹ Reelected at the convention were Sadik Side (General Secretary), Omar Ergun (Financial Secretary), and Kaya Ozdemir (Education Secretary).³² As we saw, Side has been involved with AAFLI since 1975 and Ozdemir since 1972. Ozdemir, along with Sanar Taysi (Director of Research and International Affairs, TURK-IS), was brought by AAFLI to the 1975 AFL-CIO Convention in San Francisco.³³ Ozdemir was also a featured speaker at the AAFLI/TURK-IS Labor Educators' Conference in Samsun in 1978 which was overseen by AAFLI Education Director, William Lanxner.³⁴ Omar Ergun has been involved with AAFLI since 1975 at which time he worked with Emanuel Boggs in establishing Tuko-birlik.³⁵

In closing, I want to repeat that none of the above is to cast aspersion on TURK-IS or any of the other unions named. It should, in fact, be mentioned that recently 13 trade unions affiliated with TURK-IS charged that "the employers are demanding that the government abolish all the democratic rights that the working class has obtained at the cost of their blood and life".³⁶

The above exposition is also not saying that any of the aforementioned Turkish unionists are CIA agents. It is saying, however, that they are working with AAFLI, a mechanism promoting capitalism in conjunction with the CIA. Since monopoly capitalism and the CIA are increasingly threatening to destroy all workers' rights in Turkey, it is crucial for all Turkish workers to know what AAFLI is and who AAFLI's Turkish agents are. This then is the purpose of the article.

FOOTNOTES

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2) Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1975

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- 7) *ibid.*
- 8) AAFLI News, Oct., 1976, p.3 (Available from: Suite 401, 1125 15th St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20005)
- 9) *ibid.*
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- 11) *ibid.*
- 12) AAFLI News, July, 1972, pp.2-3
- 13) *ibid.*
- 14) William Pomeroy, An American Made Tragedy, International Publishers, New York, 1974
- 15) AAFLI News, June-July, 1971, p.4
- 16) AAFLI News, May-June, 1976, p.3
- 17) AAFLI News, Nov., 1977-Jan., 1978, p.5
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- 21) *ibid.*
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- 23) Fred Hirsch and Richard Fletcher, The CIA and the Labour Movement, Spokesman Books, Nottingham, England, 1977
- 24) AAFLI News, Oct., 1975, p.2
- 25) AAFLI News, August, 1979, p.2
- 26) AAFLI News, March, 1979, p.1
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- 28) AAFLI News, May-June, 1975, pp.5-6
- 29) AAFLI News, May, 1979, p.2
- 30) *ibid.*
- 31) AAFLI News, May, 1978, p.1
- 32) AAFLI News, May, 1979, p.2
- 33) AAFLI News, Oct., 1975, p.4
- 34) AAFLI News, Feb., 1978, p.3
- 35) AAFLI News, May-June, 1975, p.5
- 36) Bulletin Info-Turk, Year IV, Nov., 1979, p.5 (Available from: Square Ch. M. Wiser, 13/2, 1040 Bruxelles, Belgium)

US-AUSTRALIAN ROLE IN EAST TIMOR GENOCIDE

by Denis Freney

(Ed. note: Denis Freney is an Australian journalist who has written extensively on the collaboration between Australian and U.S. intelligence services.⁽ⁱ⁾ He has also done support work for independence struggles in Southeast Asia. CounterSpy welcomes this contribution for the light it sheds on U.S. complicity in the genocide being waged by the Indonesian military in East Timor.⁽ⁱⁱ⁾)

Since 1904, East Timor has been the object of imperial contention in the Southeast Asian region. In that year the island of Timor was divided in half, the Dutch claiming West Timor and the eastern half going to the Portuguese. In 1912, a two year uprising against the Portuguese resulted in the death of 3,000 Timorese.

During World War II, the island was occupied first by Australian troops (in order to "protect" its "independence"), then by the Dutch, and finally by the Japanese. Allied attempts to dislodge the Japanese by bombing resulted in the destruction of Timor's few towns, damage to many villages, and the death of over 50,000 Timorese.

When Indonesia gained its independence from the Dutch following the war, this never included East Timor. With the help of the Catholic Church, which "seemed to concentrate more on helping its flock come to terms with their plight rather than on pressing for reforms" (iii), the Portuguese hung on to their island colony, exploiting it in every way possible.

Following the Portuguese revolution in 1974, political life in East Timor blossomed. Of the three major political parties at the time, only Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor) had any popular following. Fretilin's literacy and agricultural development campaigns, its support among conscripts in the Portuguese-led military forces, and its firm commitment to independence for East Timor

made a mockery of the political platforms of its rival parties.

One of them, the UDT (Timorese Democratic Union), was comprised of those who had benefitted from Portuguese rule, with several of its leaders associated with fascist parties in Portugal. A third party, APODETI (Timorese People's Democratic Association), was created by Indonesia and was the only party calling for union with Jakarta. Its president, Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo, collaborated in Japanese war crimes and was jailed after World War II. Following Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in December, 1975, Araújo was selected to head the new puppet regime (iv).

Throughout, the resistance of the people of East Timor in the twentieth century has been heroic. The latest struggle against Indonesian genocide has resulted in the loss of at least one-sixth of its population. The world knows little of the courage of the East Timorese, and still less of the complicity of the Western "democracies" in Indonesia's bloodbath. May this article serve to educate people on both.)

In the past four years, of an estimated population of 689,000 in 1974, some 100,000 (at a conservative estimate) East Timorese have been killed.¹ This followed a full-scale invasion launched by the Indonesian military dictatorship of General Suharto on December 7, 1975. In a war hidden from the world through an effective ban on visits to the island by outside journalists and the connivance of the world press, Suharto and his military have carried out an act of genocide, aimed at the ferocious resistance led by Fretilin.

Until the end of 1978, the vast majority of East Timorese and some 80 per cent of the territory was under Fretilin control. Only after mid-1978, when Indonesian campaigns of encirclement and annihilation, "advised" by U.S. officers, led to massive destruction of

food crops and homes in the liberated areas, did starvation and lack of ammunition begin to take its toll. The betrayal of former Fretilin President Xavier do Amaral in September 1977 and Information Minister Alarico Fernandez one year later also contributed to the relative success of the Suharto regime in East Timor in 1979.

Fretilin guerillas continue their resistance despite the lack of supplies from outside, an Indonesian-induced famine, and the murder of Fretilin President Nicolau Lobato on December 31, 1978. Latest reports indicate a massive, new Indonesian offensive involving over 15,000 troops aimed at destroying remaining liberated areas in the eastern part of the country, and small-scale guerilla units operating elsewhere throughout the whole territory.² It is clear that resistance continues, and will continue for a long time, even though it is now on a smaller scale than in the first three years.

It is not possible in this article to trace all the events which have occurred in East Timor before and since the 1975 invasion.³ Our main purpose will be to look at the role the U.S. government has played in aiding Suharto's genocide, and, in particular, the role of the CIA, in association with Australian intelligence organizations.

THE 1975 INVASION

On December 6, 1975, President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger arrived in Indonesia for a short visit. They were wined and dined to great effect -- off gold plates, the delicacies washed down with French champagne and wines.

The next day, 12 hours before the full-scale invasion of East Timor by over 10,000 Indonesian troops, backed by largely U.S. supplied weaponry, warships, planes, etc., Ford and Kissinger departed for Hawaii. Suitably enough, it was the anniversary of Pearl Harbor.

When they arrived in Hawaii, Ford was asked about the invasion of East Timor. According to an Associated Press (AP) report of December 7, 1975, Ford smiled

and said: "We'll talk about that later." The AP further reported that, according to Ford's press secretary Nessen, Ford and Suharto had discussed the Timor issue only in very "general terms" and Suharto had not told Ford the invasion was about to be launched. When questioned about reports that Ford had asked Suharto to delay the invasion until he left Indonesia, Nessen denied them.

Officials later also disputed reports that Kissinger had told Suharto the U.S. "understood Indonesia's position regarding East Timor". However, in October, 1975 Indonesian General Ali Murtopo had visited Washington, and as a result Kissinger had recommended that Congress double military aid to Indonesia to \$42.5 million in credit purchases, "to enable it to cope more effectively with the new political realities in Southeast Asia".⁴ At the same time, Suharto was asked not to use U.S. military equipment "conspicuously" in anything he planned.⁵

As U.S. State Department and Pentagon officials have since admitted, the arms and other equipment used in the invasion were U.S.-supplied.

The cover-up, on the part of both Indonesia and the U.S., came almost immediately. Aware that its use of U.S.-supplied weapons against East Timor broke a 1958 Washington-Jakarta agreement prohibiting use of U.S. arms for external aggression, Indonesia's for-

It would be a fair guess to say that Ford and Kissinger discussed the vital Ombai-Wettar straits with Suharto. These straits run north of East Timor. They are the only deep-water route between the Pacific and Indian oceans which U.S. nuclear submarines can use without surfacing. The alternative is the much longer route around the southern Australian coast.

Suharto and the U.S. have had a long secret agreement allowing nuclear submarines this passage. They feared that an independent East Timor may have objected to use of its territorial water for such purposes. This undoubtedly was one of the reasons for the Indonesian invasion, and the U.S. support for it.

eign minister Malik, speaking to reporters the day of the invasion, stated that "Indonesians had entered the territory in response to requests by friendly forces". But during the interview, Malik also said that Indonesia's forces would be withdrawn as soon as they determine that "peace and order are restored". Why, one might ask, was it left to Indonesia, and not to the Timorese who had "invited" them to determine when their forces would be withdrawn?

The U.S. media played along with this charade. Relying solely on Indonesian news service, papers like the New York Times and the Washington Post simply repeated once-told lies.⁸

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Attempts by U.S. officials to cloak U.S. complicity with Indonesia's invasion were equally insubstantial. In order to pay lip service to the 1958 agreement, the administration, in early 1976, placed a farcial ban on aid to Jakarta.⁹

However, aid previously processed ("in the pipeline") continued to be delivered. In effect, no aid was stopped and new agreements were not even delayed. Total aid was in fact stepped up.

In hearings before Rep. Donald Fraser's Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations in February, 1978 it was reported that "at least four separate offers of military equipment were made to the Indonesian government during the January-June 1976 'administrative suspension'. This equipment consisted mainly of supplies and parts for OV-10 Broncos, Vietnam War-era planes specially designed for counterinsurgency operations against adversaries without effective anti-aircraft weapons, and wholly useless for defending Indonesia from a foreign enemy. The policy of supplying the Indonesian regime with Broncos, as well as other counterinsurgency-related equipment has continued without substantial change from the Ford to the present Carter administrations".¹⁰ As

then-Chairperson Fraser stated in the hearings, the "suspension" reminded him of "the Cheshire Cat in Alice in Wonderland: all we have left is the grin".

In July, 1976 the Suharto regime orchestrated an "act of free choice" in which 28 hand-picked Timorese puppets voted for integration with Indonesia. The Ford administration immediately recognized this vote as legalizing Jakarta's aggression against and annexation of East Timor. Use of U.S. supplied weapons now became "internal" to Indonesia and the suspension of aid (that never was) was abandoned.

Nevertheless, the resistance of the Fretilin forces was such that by the end of 1977 a diplomat was quoted as saying that the Indonesian military "is running out of military inventory. The operations in Timor have pushed them to the wall".¹¹

The Indonesian military had suffered catastrophic failures in East Timor. Corruption at the top, lack of military expertise, and demoralized troops accounted for some 17,000 Indonesian dead.¹² In addition, Suharto was facing, particularly at the beginning of 1978, serious internal problems at home, and there were doubts whether his regime could survive. Military difficulties in East Timor compounded these problems, while leading to growing awareness of what was happening.

Washington and other western capitals became alarmed and rushed to Suharto's aid. This provided the basis for the major offensive launched from July 1978 onwards.

In mid-1978, Fretilin radio, broadcasting from inside East Timor, began to denounce, for the first time, the presence of U.S. military advisers in East Timor. The Fretilin radio claimed they were flying helicopter gunships, directing fire, and even participating in attacks. The radio also quoted eye-witnesses who had seen the body of an American mercenary who was killed in the Remexio area, near the capital Dili.

Also, according to Fretilin radio, two U.S. military advisers arrived in Dili in December 1977. More arrived in the following three months and were taken to Aileu (40 kms. south of Dili) by trucks and helicopters. The radio estimated that roughly ten U.S. advisers were fighting with the Indonesians near

Lekidoe on June 13, 1978, and in Remexio village on June 21 and 22. They were also sighted in fighting in the north-west and central parts of the country. In addition, they were training Indonesian troops in Aileu and Laklubar. On July 5, 1978, one U.S. adviser landed on Kaitasso mountain near Remexio to help Indonesian troops fighting there. The advisers were in the uniform of the Indonesian Red Berets and were being "very careful" in battles.¹³

Despite the fact that these reports were very detailed, and that Fretilin radio had been reliable in the past,¹⁴ independent observers such as Australian diplomat Jim Dunn¹⁵ were highly sceptical, given U.S. and Indonesian denials and lack of independent confirmation. In April 1979, however, even Dunn reported "an Indonesian official source" as stating that "U.S. military personnel had from time to time visited East Timor to inspect the situation".¹⁶

The U.S. military has, since the mid-1950's, maintained extensive training programs for the Indonesian military, both in the States and in Indonesia itself. In March 1975, there were 56 U.S. military personnel and five U.S. civilian experts posted in Indonesia as part of the "U.S. Defense Liaison Group" which has been operating in Indonesia for many years. Between 1971 and 1975, a total of 1,500 Indonesian officers were trained in the U.S. and more by the Defense Liaison Group in Indonesia itself. Up until December 1976, \$22,680,000 had been spent on these training programs by the U.S. government.¹⁷

Given the fact that, since July 1976, the Ford administration (and, following it, the Carter administration) has recognized East Timor as part of Indonesia, and East Timor has been the site of the only war Indonesia has been involved in during the past five years, we can assume that the U.S. military advisers sighted by Fretilin in 1978 were probably part of the U.S. Defense Liaison Group stationed in Indonesia, officially carrying out "normal", "training" functions.

FRETILIN'S STRUGGLE

When Portuguese fascism was overthrown in April 1974, the news hit East Timor like a bombshell. Only a small, clandestine group of East Timorese supporting independence had existed in Dili and among Timorese students in Lisbon, Portugal since 1970. They had discussed and clarified their political ideas, and had established contacts with Frelimo and MPLA, the two groups which were waging national liberation struggles in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola, respectively. But their possibilities for action were limited, as neither Australia nor Indonesia would offer them a base for operations.

However, when political rights were established in May 1974, this clandestine group formed the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT)¹⁸ which within a year had won the support of a large majority of East Timorese, and had raised political consciousness in an extraordinary way.

The hot-house development of East Timorese politics took the Australian and U.S. intelligence by complete surprise. Portuguese Timor had been one of the most backward and isolated countries of the world. It would have been a bottom priority for any intelligence agency. Yet, within a month of April 1974, there were three political parties competing for support, the Portuguese military was drifting rapidly to the left, and Timorese students with a Marxist education were returning to their homeland from Lisbon, "infected" from the upsurge there.

By September 1974, the ASDT had been transformed into the Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor (Fretilin) and its militants were spreading out into the mountains and working among Timorese conscripts in the Portuguese colonial army in the territory. In January 1975, the conservative Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), swept along by events, joined in a coalition with Fretilin, based on a program taken almost word for word from Fretilin's own program. Within a few months, Fretilin had the overwhelming support of the East Timorese.

The U.S. and Australia were quick to

move. In June 1974, William A. Pierce, the U.S. vice consul in Surabaya, Indonesia, visited Dili for three days to check out the situation. He returned reassured by the more conservative of the ASDT leaders. However, concern mounted as the Indonesian propaganda machine began to turn out stories of "communists" in Fretilin, coinciding with the return of radical students from Lisbon.¹⁹

Australian journalist/intelligence adviser Peter Hastings arrived in Dili on October 26, 1974 in order to strengthen contact with Fretilin leader Jose Ramos-Horta whom he had met in Canberra in July. He also wanted to familiarize himself with the whole situation in East Timor, as well as contact leaders of Fretilin and other political organizations.

Hastings returned to Australia concerned but determined to find a neo-colonial solution. On December 3, 1974, he took Horta (then visiting Canberra) to lunch, where he introduced him to Gordon Jockel, a former Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, and head of the Joint Intelligence Organization (JIO). The JIO had been set up in 1970, under the guidance of the CIA's Analysis Branch.

THE CIA'S AUSTRALIAN LINKS

The lack of American expertise in East Timor had quickly resulted in close coordination of CIA actions there with Australian intelligence. This had many advantages. First, Fretilin was highly suspicious of Americans in general, having read of CIA actions elsewhere in the world. Australians were, on the other hand, more readily accepted, especially due to the fact that Australian commandos had fought there during the Second World War and had established a good reputation with their paternalistic attitude which contrasted strongly with the brutality of the Portuguese and Japanese.

Hastings, himself, had a long association with the CIA, dating back to his work with Australian intelligence during World War II. While his main interest remained Papua New Guinea, he also operated in West Irian and closely followed events in Indonesia. As associate

editor of the Sydney Morning Herald, Hastings was able to use his journalist hat to advantage.

Another Australian with close CIA links was (now Sir) Bernard Callinan. As a captain of the Australian commandos in East Timor during World War II, he had established close, personal links with the educated elite in the territory, and later spent many holidays there. After being evacuated from East Timor, he became something of a war hero and ended the war as a Brigadier. As a Catholic in the largely WASP Australian Establishment, he had a bit of a fight to establish a place for himself, but after setting up a successful engineering firm, he was chosen by the Australian government in the late 1950's to serve as an "adviser" to South Vietnam's Diem, who was of course also Catholic.

Callinan, who had gained a reputation as a counterinsurgency expert after his Timor experience, undoubtedly had wide contacts with the CIA during his Vietnam tour. During his time there, Australian "advisers" were being trained by the CIA under its Special Forces program.²⁰ After Diem was assassinated, Callinan returned to Australia to become vice-president of the Victorian branch of the extreme-rightist Democratic Labor Party (DLP) and was subsequently appointed to numerous government and semi-government jobs.

It was through Australians such as Hastings and Callinan, and more generally through the Australian intelligence organizations, that the CIA got much of its basic information on East Timor, and through which it tried to influence events among Fretilin leaders in particular.

This was not the first time this had occurred. It is important that liberation movements around the world be alerted to the close liaison existing between Australian intelligence and the CIA.

Australia is a long way from most other parts of the world, and little is known about it. Thus, Australian intelligence can often fill in gaps for the CIA. Two examples are well known. In Cambodia, from 1970, the ultra-secret Australian intelligence service ASIS (Australian Secret Intelli-

gence Service) acted for the CIA after Sihanouk broke off diplomatic relations with the U.S. Similarly, in Chile just prior to the 1973 coup against President Salvador Allende, ASIS operatives working out of the Australian Embassy in Santiago played an important role within CIA operations. The then-Prime Minister McMahon admitted this collaboration in the mid-1970's.

Direct American links with East Timor were scanty. With the exception of a few American anthropologists who were doing field research there, and at least one of whom Fretilin claimed was CIA, direct CIA involvement in East Timor was scarce. There was, however, a U.S. oil exploration corporation that quickly moved in to establish rights to the suspected rich oil reserves off the East Timor coast.

NOT JUST OIL

Oceanic Exploration Co., of Denver, Colorado had, in 1975, over 107 million acres of oil prospecting rights on and offshore all the world's continents, with very big interests in Somoza's Nicaragua. The corporation is small - compared to the oil giants - but in East Timor Oceanic Exploration played a disturbing and curious role.

Almost immediately after the change of power in Portugal in April 1974, Oceanic Exploration began negotiations with the Portuguese government for offshore oil rights in the Timor Sea, south of East Timor. In December 1974, the Portuguese government granted Oceanic rights in large areas of the Timor Sea, including areas in dispute with the Australian government, which made an official protest. Oceanic's rights conflicted with rights granted to a big league consortium - Arco/Aquitaine/Exxon - by Australia.

Oceanic's negotiator was J.E. Bakken, its treasurer/controller. He appointed a part-Timorese, Jaime Santos, as Oceanic's representative in Dili, and visited the territory a number of times in 1975 -- in May, July, and August.

Bakken's visits were curiously timed and coincided with a series of political crises in East Timor. In May 1975, the

UDT broke off its coalition with Fretilin and began a rabid anti-communist campaign against its former ally. In July, the UDT was preparing for its coup, which was staged in August and coincided with Bakken's third visit.

All of this may have been coincidental. However, Oceanic's Dili representative, Jaime Santos, was not only a leading figure in the UDT, but was interestingly enough also in charge of plans to obtain a supply of weapons from Australia for the coup.

Also in April 1975, UDT leaders had visited Australia after a tour of Jakarta and Hong Kong. In Jakarta, the UDT leaders had been wooed by General Ali Murtopo who was "project officer for the acquisition of East Timor" or "Operation Komodo" as it was known. Murtopo told Dili Mayor Mouzinho "you could be mayor of Jakarta one day" and boasted that the Indonesian Army could take East Timor in two hours (!).

In Australia, the UDT leaders met with Bernard Callinan, whom they had known for many years. He backed Murtopo's demand that they break the coalition with Fretilin and urged them to unite with Apodeti (the miniscule pro-Indonesian group) against "communism". He allegedly said: "There's only one thing now: fix it with Indonesia and UDT and Apodeti will unite to throw communism out." His position was further supported by JIO chief Gordon Jockel whom the UDT met in Canberra. On returning to Dili, the UDT leaders broke the coalition with Fretilin, and soon afterwards set out to organize support in Jakarta and Australia for a UDT coup.

Jaime Santos played a key role in garnering support. He went to Australia and met with extreme right-wing forces there, linked with the army and intelligence, and through them arranged for weapons to be sent to East Timor for the coup.

Among these involved in this operation were friends of Callinan, members of an extreme right-wing network around a man named Michael Darby (who was later to fly into East Timor after the failure of the UDT coup), and an Australian pilot working in East Timor, Roger Ruddock, whose parents in Perth were part of the Darby network.

Michael Darby had worked as a captain in the intelligence services of the Australian Army in Vietnam, where he naturally had excellent CIA ties. The son of an eccentric extreme right-wing Liberal (conservative) Party parliamentarian, he, like his father, maintained over a long period close links with Taiwan and the different international anti-communist bodies centered there.

(Darby still operates the Taiwan Travel Agency in Sydney which functions as a de facto consulate for Taipei since Australia recognized the People's Republic of China. It is worth noting that Darby has since been active in the Vietnam refugee movement, and as a leader of the extreme right of the governing Liberal Party in which he is closely identified with Ustasha Croatian fascist elements and with a proven war criminal from Slovenia, Ljzenko Urbanchich.)

Jaime Santos may or may not have been successful in getting weapons into East Timor from Australia. Some Timorese claim that he smuggled them in by plane through Baucau airport, where UDT officials were in high positions. In any case, he was in Dili when the coup attempt was launched on the night of August 10-11, 1975 and played an important military role in it, before fleeing to Australia when Fretilin launched their counter-offensive.

Also in Dili at the time was J.E. Bakken of Oceanic. Bakken flew into Dili from Darwin, Australia on August 7, 1975 -- three days before the coup. He flew out of Dili on August 17, just before the Fretilin counter-attack, and when Fretilin had seized one Portuguese army post. Bakken got out just in time - if he had remained a few more days he might have been asked some embarrassing questions by the victorious Fretilin forces.

All the evidence concerning Bakken is of course circumstantial. There is no hard evidence that he had anything to do with the UDT coup. However, it would be interesting to know just what he was doing in Dili around that time, and his exact relations with Jaime Santos, the UDT, and the Indonesians.

The links between oil companies and the CIA are legion. Oil companies often rely on CIA intelligence to size up

different host-government ministries regarding their willingness to grant concessions. Oil companies also make use of the CIA's penetration of a foreign country's labor movement in order to gauge the relative safety of doing business in a country. In return, these companies often provide CIA operatives with cover.

As for Bakken's company, Oceanic has been lobbying in Jakarta since 1976 to have its oil exploration rights - granted by Lisbon - recognized by Suharto. At last, report, they had succeeded. Jakarta is at loggerheads with the Australian government over the seabed boundary in the Timor Sea, taking the same position as Portugal, and, for that matter, Fretilin (who, of course, do not accept Jakarta's right to negotiate this question).

On August 11, 1975, after the night of the coup, UDT was in control of Dili, Baucau and the international airport there. The Portuguese Governor Lemos Pires, who had been sent to East Timor in "exile" by the radical Armed Forces Movement in Lisbon, and who from the beginning was reputedly linked with the CIA, ordered Timorese conscripts to remain in their barracks. UDT gangs roamed the streets, killing Fretilin members and imprisoning others. Almost all other Fretilin leaders had managed to flee to the hills, however, after being tipped off about the coming coup. Almost immediately, the UDT began to send messages to Darwin, Australia from the air control tower at Baucau airport. Reading them was the Australian pilot, Roger Ruddock, on behalf of UDT President Lopez da Cruz. (He is now vice-president in the Indonesian-puppet East Timor assembly.)

The messages were directed to "base commander, Darwin" and appealed for military supplies to be flown into East Timor to help the UDT coup "against communism" and "to remove the communists from Timor for the security of the Southeast Asia area". It named a number of areas including Viqueque on the southern coast, and Maliana, on the border with Indonesian (West) Timor, as landing areas. In a number of these messages was added the words: "Request Base Commander also contact Guam."

Guam, of course, is a major U.S. mili-

tary base in the Pacific - the nearest to East Timor. One can only guess at the reason for this UDT appeal, and whether there had been any earlier contact with Guam .. or the CIA.²¹

The Australian government refused to reply to UDT requests, but arranged for a Foreign Affairs officer, Bill Fisher to fly into Dili on a chartered plane, with UDT agreement. On August 17, the same plane returned to Darwin, with J. E. Bakken on board.²²

The UDT did not get the military aid they sought. On August 20, after fruitless negotiations trying to get the Portuguese to restore the status quo, Fretilin launched a call for insurrection. The Timorese conscripts seized the army arsenals and within a few days controlled Dili. By mid-September, all of the territory was under Fretilin control, and the UDT leaders fled to Indonesian Timor where the majority readily agreed to become Indonesian puppets. The Portuguese fled to the offshore island of Atauro.

UDT refugees in Australia who had been evacuated by plane and air began to spread horror stories about non-existent Fretilin atrocities. Then a TV team from Sydney, accompanied by none other than Michael Darby, sailed from Darwin to Dili, to find Fretilin in control and no atrocities. Darby lost no time in organizing a medical team's trip into Dili, and quickly proclaimed his pro-Fretilin sympathies. Roger Ruddock, who, when not broadcasting to Darwin for the UDT, bombed Fretilin positions from a light plane, had escaped to Darwin. A new strategy had begun: win over the "moderate" Fretilin leaders and isolate the "communists".

U.S. AND AUSTRALIAN INTELLIGENCE AND THE INDONESIAN INVASION

The August 1975 UDT coup attempt was a crucial turning point for East Timor. It provided an excuse for the Indonesian invasion. The rump UDT and the miniscule APODETI were merged by the Jakarta generals into an "Anti-Communist Movement" which called for East Timor's integration with Indonesia. The Portuguese used it as an excuse to leave the territory, as they had wanted

to do since April 1974. The Australian government refused to recognize Fretilin's de facto control and even, during the Fretilin counter-attack, called for Indonesian intervention.

On the other hand, the UDT coup and the Fretilin counter-offensive resulted in Fretilin winning complete control of the territory, and, at the same time, control of the substantial arsenal of NATO-issue light arms that the Portuguese had in the country. The UDT - and their Australian and Indonesian advisers - had seriously underestimated the support Fretilin had among the Timorese people, and, therefore, among the Timorese conscripts in the Portuguese army.

The Australian intelligence community was divided on what position to take on East Timor. One section, based in JIO and the Defense Department, with some support in the Foreign Affairs hierarchy, opposed an Indonesian takeover and favored a neo-colonial solution, with East Timor as "independent" as, for example Bhutan (a small Himalayan state whose foreign policy and economy is controlled by neighboring India). This section feared that an invasion of East Timor would lead to a long-term radicalization of Indonesia.

The other, majority group was based in Foreign Affairs and its intelligence service, ASIS. They saw Suharto as the main bulwark against "communism" and wanted to support him in all circumstances.

While Michael Darby and his right-wing group were linked more to the first group, ASIS set about finding its own sources in East Timor. It recruited an Australian hotel and plantation owner, Frank Favaro, as its agent in Dili after Fretilin won power. Favaro was ideally suited: he knew Timor well, had his own light plane, and his own radio communication equipment.

Favaro was recruited, however, without the knowledge of the Australian government which, while supporting an Indonesian takeover, wanted to keep clear of any presence in East Timor. Favaro was boasting in Dili that he was the "Australian Consul". When Labor Party Prime Minister Whitlam learned of Favaro's recruitment by ASIS, he summarily dismissed the chief

of ASIS, T. Robertson. Whitlam, soon to be sacked by the appointed representative of the Queen of England, the Governor General, was having his own trouble with the CIA.²³

On October 16, 1975, five Australian TV journalists were shot down by Indonesian troops when they captured the small East Timorese village of Balibo. Some 450 miles away, the Australian Defense Signals Directorate (DSD) base at Shoal Bay, near Darwin, intercepted Indonesian field communications from Balibo to Batugade (an Indonesian-occupied village right on the border between East and West Timor). The communications were from the Indonesian forces which had just killed the Australian journalists. Within hours, news of their murder was on the desks of the JIO, government departments, the Prime Minister, and other ministers. Yet, to this day, the Australian government maintains that it has no "evidence" that the journalists were killed by Indonesian troops.²⁴

The DSD, under the secret United Kingdom-USA Treaty of 1952 (to which Australia is also a signatory), is closely coordinated into the network of over two thousand U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) listening posts around the world. NSA officers are present in all DSD posts, many of which are situated around Darwin, to spy on Southeast Asia and further afield. Fifty NSA officers work out of the DSD's Melbourne Albert Park headquarters alone.²⁵ The DSD undoubtedly sent the information from Balibo on to the NSA, and, therefore, through to other U.S. intelligence agencies.

Given the undisputed ability of the DSD/NSA to monitor short-range and low-frequency field radio communications in East Timor, the question arises as to what use was made of Fretilin communications intercepted during this period, and particularly after the December invasion. Fretilin used Portuguese field radios of a type freely available to Western intelligence services. In the past, for example, the NSA has boasted of the role it played in locating Che Guevara's guerillas in the Bolivian jungles through their radio communications, thus enabling the CIA-trained Bolivian troops to track him down and kill him.

In December 1978, 2,500 Indonesian troops launched a massive operation to kill or capture Fretilin President Nicolau Lobato, who had circulated freely through the mountains of East Timor for three years since the 1975 invasion. When he was killed on December 31, 1978, he had a transmitter with him.

This operation occurred a few months after Fretilin had charged that U.S. military advisers were fighting alongside Indonesian troops in East Timor. While there are other facts which may have led to the location of Nicolau Lobato, it can not be ruled out that the DSD/NSA played a role. Indonesia's own attempts to jam Fretilin radio communications with the outside world have proved signally inept.²⁶

THE COVER-UP

From September until December 1975, Fretilin controlled East Timor, with the exception of a few border villages taken by Indonesian troops from October onwards. Fretilin opened the country to journalists and observers. At least one group of journalists - a Japanese TV team - acted as Indonesian spies, showing their film to General Ali Murtopo in Jakarta before returning to Tokyo.

The independent journalists who entered East Timor witnessed the progress made by Fretilin in solving food problems, the success of their literacy campaigns, and their efforts in repelling Indonesian border attacks. Fretilin leaders proclaimed independence on November 28, 1975 after the Portuguese government refused to return to East Timor in order to resume the decolonization process, and after Indonesian troops launched a major attack on Atabae, only 30 kms. from the capital Dili.

On December 2, 1975, the International Red Cross in Dili received a warning from Australian Foreign Affairs saying that Indonesian troops would kill any Australian remaining in East Timor. This information was no doubt also from a DSD/NSA intercept or other intelligence sources. The Red Cross (staffed mainly by Australian doctors)

and all Australian journalists and residents, with one exception, were evacuated by the Australian Air Force a few days before the invasion. The one person who did not leave, Australian journalist Rodger East, was killed by the Indonesian troops on the day of the invasion.

These threats and murders (five journalists had already been murdered in October) by the Indonesians were "evidence of a final effort by Indonesia to clear the territory of foreign observers before the invasion began".²⁷ It was important, so reasoned Indonesia, that no independent observers be present. This applied especially to the Red Cross, whose absence "would mean that the important work of enforcing the Geneva conventions could not be done".²⁸

The Australian government knew that the invasion was about to occur but remained silent and thereby actively collaborated in Indonesia's plans to "integrate" East Timor. As early as October 29, 1975, the Australian Ambassador to Jakarta, Richard Woolcott, cabled advice to the Foreign Affairs Department that "Australian knowledge of Indonesia's intervention be concealed" to avoid complications with Indonesia.²⁹

Since the invasion, one of the major roles of U.S. intelligence agencies has been to help in the cover-up of the genocide carried out by Suharto's troops. In Congressional hearings in 1977 and 1978, and most recently in November 1979, U.S. State Department officials have quoted "our own intelligence" ³⁰ as placing the death toll at "probably under 10,000". Such figures are a gross and conscious underestimation of the death toll.

For example, the then-Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Adam Malik, said on March 31, 1977: "The total (death toll) may be 50,000 or perhaps 80,000. But what does this mean if compared with 600,000 who wanted to join Indonesia? What is the big fuss?" ³¹ When faced with this statement, a State Department official told the Australian Broadcasting Commission: "If Malik said this, he is wrong."³² Obviously, the CIA knows best!

The cover-up continues: U.S. Ambassador Edward Masters, told a Con-

gressional hearing in December 1979 that he has not followed up reports of Indonesian forces using starvation as a means of fighting Fretilin "because he did not think such a policy existed".³³ Masters, listed in the volume 4, no. 1 issue of CounterSpy as an intelligence operative in Jakarta during the bloody Suharto coup in 1965, is no stranger to the art of cover-up for mass murder.

American Catholic Relief Service, which has a long history of collaboration with the CIA and U.S. military operations, is now in East Timor, supposedly to provide famine relief for the 240,000 East Timorese herded into Indonesian concentration camps. CRS has been denounced even by Indonesian Catholic Church sources as "just functioning as a link between the Indonesian Army and the U.S. AID" which "should not be described as a Church programme".³⁴

True, CRS's Frank Carlin said in Dili in late October 1979, that East Timor was the worst situation he has seen "in 14 years of relief work in Asia" while an International Red Cross official said it was "as bad as Biafra and potentially as serious as Kampuchea".³⁵ Still, this did not prevent CRS's regional director Amando Sonaggere from telling a U.S. Congressional hearing just one month later that this situation "no longer existed" (!) ³⁷. In other words, a situation which "might be worse than Kampuchea" had been solved in little over a month!

CONCLUSION

The role of the U.S. government, the CIA/NSA, and their Australian collaborators in East Timor is another example of support for genocide which joins a long list of similar cases that have been chronicled in CounterSpy and other journals.

The Carter and Ford administrations have been accomplices in the massacre of anywhere between one-in-ten (Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar's latest figure) ³⁸ and one-in-two Timorese.³⁹

Those figures are hard to equal. It is time the American people knew the facts and moved to end this genocide done in their name.

FOOTNOTES

- i) See Denis Freney, The CIA's Australian Connection, 1977, publ. by Denis Freney, P.O. Box A716, Sydney South, NSW.2000
- ii) See Denis Freney, Timor: Freedom Caught Between the Powers, Spokesman Books, London, 1975
- iii) See Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights, Vol.1, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, South End Press, Boston, 1979
- iv) *ibid.*

1) Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar admitted 60,000 dead (London Financial Times, November 16, 1979) while a former Australian diplomat in Jakarta, Peter Rodgers estimated 100,000 dead (Sydney Morning Herald, October 31, 1979). Other independent observers estimate between 100,000 and 300,000 dead. For more complete analysis, see East Timor News, Nos. 60-63.

2) The Australian, December 15-16, 1979 and reports gathered by the author.

3) There are a number of books available, e.g. Jill Jolliffe, East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1978, for events up to the invasion; Arnold Kohen and John Taylor, An Act of Genocide: Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor, Tapol, England, 1979. East Timor News has covered events for the past three years (ETNA, 4th floor, 232 Castlereagh St., Sydney NSW.2000).

4) Melbourne Age, October 22, 1975.

5) National Times (Sydney), October 13-18, 1975.

6) U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Hearings on "Human Rights in East Timor and Use of U.S. Equipment by Indonesian Armed Forces", March 23, 1977.

7) New York Times, December 8, 1975.

8) Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights,

Vol.1, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, South End Press, Boston, 1979, pp. 146, 147.

9) *cf supra*, # 6

10) U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Organizations, "U.S. Policy on Human Rights and Military Assistance: Overview and Indonesia" February 15, 1978, pp. 36, 37; cited as in Chomsky and Herman, The Washington Connection, p. 145.

11) International Herald Tribune, December 5, 1977.

12) Fretilin radio broadcasts in September, 1978 estimated 20,000 Indonesian soldiers killed in East Timor. An Indonesian official source estimated in November, 1979 a total of 17,000 Indonesians killed (a private source to the author). A UPI report from Jakarta (The Australian, November 8, 1979) quoted Indonesian military sources as admitting that Indonesian forces had "suffered high casualties" in fighting Fretilin.

13) East Timor News, No. 38, July 27, 1978; and previous issues.

14) Details of the massacre in Dili on days of the invasion in December, 1975 given by Fretilin radio have since been confirmed, including officially by Indonesians. Fretilin radio claimed in November, 1976 that Indonesian forces were using napalm, but in May, 1977 said they had stopped using napalm after worldwide protests. Reports of scale of fighting etc., given by Fretilin have since been confirmed.

15) Jim Dunn was Australian Consul in East Timor under the Portuguese, an Australian diplomat in many cities including Moscow, and, for a period, an analyst with the Joint Intelligence Organization (JIO). He is now in charge of the South-East section of the Parliamentary Research Service, and has exposed Indonesian atrocities in East Timor.

16) In a Parliamentary Research Paper, see East Timor News, No. 53, May 3, 1979.

17) East Timor News, No. 38

18) ASDT -- Timorese Social Democratic Association, renamed Fretilin in September, 1974. The other two parties were UDT (Timorese Democratic Union) formed by a conservative elite, which

followed a Spinoлиста position, and APODETI (Timorese Peoples Democratic Association), a very small group favoring integration with Indonesia. All were formed in May, 1974.

19) These "ex-students" such as Mau-Lear, Sa'he and Hamis Basserwan are now leading the guerilla struggle in East Timor.

20) CIA collaborator and Australian journalist Denis Warner in ABC broadcast on August 28, 1977.

21) For coverage of these events see Denis Freney, Timor: Freedom Caught Between the Powers, Spokesman Books, London, 1975. The UDT message to Darwin were reprinted in part in the Sydney Morning Herald, August 18, 1975. (Originals in possession of the author).

22) Bill Fisher has since turned up in another potential trouble spot -- the New Hebrides -- as Australian Consul. The New Hebrides are soon to become independent under the Vanuaaku Pati, which won 70 per cent of the vote in the recent elections. Right-wing millionaires Michael Oliver and Harold Peacock, linked with ex-CIA mercenaries around one Mitchell Livingston Werbell, are planning a coup there... (see Melbourne Age, April 11, 1979 and Seli Hoo, No. 8, May 1979, for full exposure). The New Hebrides are a joint British-French colony in the South Pacific, east of the Australian coast.

23) For background on Australian intelligence links with the CIA, and the role of the CIA in the overthrow of the Australian Labor Party government in November, 1975, see Denis Freney, The CIA's Australian Connection.

24) "Death at Balibou", a lengthy investigation by Hamish McDonald, National Times (Sydney), July 7, 1979.

25) National Times (Sydney), May 23-28, 1977

26) The Campaign for Independent East Timor maintained clandestine two-way radio contact from Darwin, Australia, with Fretilin radio in East Timor from immediately after the invasion until the surrender of Fretilin Information Minister Alarico Fernandez in December, 1978. On a number of occasions the Indonesians attempted to jam the radio contact. It was discovered that jamming only occurred between 9am and 5pm each day, and not on weekends. Australian security police twice seized the underground radio in Darwin.

27) see Chomsky and Herman, The Washington Connection, p. 144.

28) ibid.

29) ibid.

30) For example, evidence of Robert B. Oakley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, cf supra, # 6.

31) Melbourne Age and Canberra Times, April 1, 1977.

32) ABC Radio program "AM", April 1, 1977.

33) The Australian, December 6, 1979.

34) Australian Council for Overseas Aid report on East Timor, reprinted in full in East Timor News, No. 61-62, November 22, 1978.

35) Sydney Morning Herald, October 31, 1979.

36) Canberra Times, November 3, 1979.

37) The Australian, December 6, 1979.

38) London Financial Times, November 16, 1979.

39) see cf supra, # 1

CIA INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

by Konrad Ege

On January 4, 1980, President Jimmy Carter denounced the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan as "naked aggression", and as a "deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people".¹ This speech launched a large-scale media campaign. The media is now being marshalled to portray the current events in Afghanistan in such a way as that the "crisis" there can be used as a pretext for increasing U.S. military presence in the Middle East/South Asia region, and for creating an "interventionist mood" in the U.S. public. Given this governmental manipulation of the media, it is necessary to examine reports of events in Afghanistan very carefully.

THE OVERTHROW OF HAFIZULLAH AMIN

Although questions remain regarding how Afghan president Amin was overthrown and replaced by Babrak Karmal on December 27, 1979, one fact appears to be certain: the main thrust of the U.S. government version of events - that Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan and put Karmal in as their puppet - is pure propaganda.

First, the Soviet troop movement into Afghanistan does not constitute an "invasion" (defined as one country sending troops into another country against that country's will). Soviet troops began arriving in Kabul as early as December 8, 1979.² Needless to say, on December 8, almost three weeks before he was deposed, Hafizullah Amin still spoke for Afghanistan.

Secondly, Soviet troops were asked in to defend popularly supported reforms under attack by a foreign supported reactionary sector of society. Although it is seldom mentioned in the U.S. media, no one has ever denied that Amin

requested Soviet troops as early as December 8. Nor has anyone denied that the reforms (under attack) were beneficial to the overwhelming majority of Afghans. In fact, the latter was even attested to by Abdul Rahim Ghafoorzai, an Afghan government defector.³

On December 15, Amin called for even more Soviet troops.⁴ On December 25 and 26, these additional troops arrived in Kabul, and according to the Washington Star, were "to help ... Amin stamp out a stubborn rebellion" ⁵ of armed groups opposing his government and the popularly-supported reforms.

Amin came to power after the reforms had been put in motion and ruled Afghanistan for only three months. He had gradually come to head the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) (then split into the Khalq and the Parcham factions) which ousted an oppressive, feudal regime closely aligned with the former shah of Iran in April, 1978.

After coming to power, the PDP, under Noor Mohammed Taraki, initiated widespread revolutionary programs to the benefit of the people. In September 1979, Hafizullah Amin overthrew Taraki and installed himself as ruler, ousting many PDP members and resorting to increased repression against his opponents. In short, Amin was in the process of setting back many of the gains made by the PDP's revolutionary programs, and was fueling increasing opposition even from his own party.

To make matters worse, foreign forces including the U.S. tried to exploit this uncertain situation, exacerbated by Amin's repression, by escalating their involvement with reactionary sectors of the Afghan society whose real objective was to destroy the sorely-needed revolutionary programs of the PDP.

The Carter administration has ridiculed the Soviet version of events in Afghanistan - that they were called in to fight this reactionary opposition -

but even the London Times comments: "... despite the scepticism of President Carter and Mrs. Thatcher the Red Army may have entered Kabul - initially - at (Amin's) own request".⁶

The question of whether or not the Soviet Union "invaded" Afghanistan is of vital concern. As John Somerville, Professor Emeritus at the City University of New York points out, the U.S. government "has no case" for retaliatory measures if the Soviet Union did not "invade" Afghanistan. "Whether in fact the USSR violated international law depends entirely on the answer to the question: Did the Government of Afghanistan invite the USSR to come in with its troops? The USSR says yes. The Government of Afghanistan says yes. When our government says no, and insists that the Soviet troops 'invaded' Afghanistan, it is obviously flying in the face of both fact and law."⁷

On December 27, 1979, Hafizullah Amin was overthrown by PDP members and by members of the Afghan military, probably with the help of Soviet troops, and executed as an "agent of American imperialism" and a "demagogic tyrannical dictator".⁸ His ouster received broad popular support; the London Times reported under the headline "Kabul Rejoiced at Amin Execution" that on December 28, people "thronged the streets 'in a holiday spirit'".⁹ Babrak Karmal, who took power after Amin, then requested more Soviet assistance to resist foreign attempts to destabilize the Afghan government; and in the following months, tens of thousands of Soviet troops entered Afghanistan.

THE CARTER DOCTRINE

The continued assertion by the Carter administration that Afghanistan was "invaded" by Soviet troops has been used to rationalize disturbing changes in U.S. foreign and military policies. In his January 4 speech, President Carter announced a series of economic "penalties" against the Soviet Union including halting the delivery of 17 million tons of grain to the Soviet Union.

Pushing harder, the Wall Street Journal was unsatisfied with economic sanc-

tions and wrote that trade sanctions were "at best irrelevant"; instead, the American reaction should be "military". According to the Journal, measures should include: establishment of U.S. bases in the Middle East, reinstatement of draft registration, development of new weapon systems, "unleashing" of the CIA, and, "Clearly we ought to keep open the chance of covert aid to Afghan rebels".¹⁰

Later, in what has become known as his "Doctrine", President Carter declared in his State of the Union address on January 23, 1980, that the Persian Gulf area "now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan" is synonymous with U.S. interests, and that the U.S. will "defend" it against any threat by all means necessary. This led even the Washington Post to comment: "Carter's unilateral declaration of a new defense perimeter - in effect placing the Persian Gulf on the same footing as western Europe - was a bold exercise of presidential authority. The United States has no security treaties with any of the Persian Gulf nations ... Last night, administration officials refused to say what is meant by the 'Persian Gulf' but suggested it included Iran."¹¹

Along with the "Carter Doctrine", another "doctrine" must be taken into account. On January 28, the fiscal 1981 military "posture statement" was released by Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown. Brown writes that the greatest danger to "U.S. security" does not come from "Soviet expansionism" but from "disturbances" in developing nations. Brown explains: "The particular manner in which our economy has expanded ... means that we have come to depend to no small degree on imports, exports and the earnings from overseas investments for our material well being."¹²

Brown's statement lays bare that the real reason behind the Carter Doctrine is not any "invasion" of Afghanistan but rather the continued expansion of U.S. private investments in this area of the world as well as their protection against indigenous popular opposition movements fighting repressive, U.S. backed regimes. To this end, Brown is pushing for a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) which will be used for "interven-

In his State of the Union address, President Carter stressed the "need to remove unwarranted restraints on our ability to collect intelligence and to tighten our control on sensitive intelligence information".

With this statement, he gave a new push to ongoing efforts by the CIA, in conjunction with conservative members of Congress, to free the CIA from any legal restraints on its operations, however weak and unenforced those restraints have been. (e.g., CIA Director Stansfield Turner testified recently that the CIA had consciously ignored laws requiring reports to Congressional Committees prior to covert operations.)

Provisions in the proposed legislation include severely limiting the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (even though CIA officials acknowledge that they can protect "legitimate secrets" under the present FOIA); and making publication of the names of CIA officers illegal, even if the information leading to the publication is obtained from public sources.

Both Senate and House Committees have already sponsored bills which would create a "greater operational flexibility" for the CIA "in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan" in the words of Walter Huddleston, chairperson of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Using the Afghan "crisis", Carter and the Congress are moving rapidly to legitimate and institutionalize the CIA's covert operations, which have been going on since 1947.

tions" through "missions in varying terrain ... around the world". The New York Times speculates that the "most likely contingency (for use of the RDF) would be a revolt in Saudi Arabia in which case the Saudis (the New York Times is here referring to the royal family and not the whole Saudi people) urged Washington for support".¹³

Of significance is the fact that Carter's State of the Union address was not received well in the Middle East. Even most of the repressive, U.S. orient-

ed oil producing regimes were not eager to be "protected" by the U.S. military. Addressing Carter, Al-Anba' (Kuwait) wrote: "The last thing we want is protection and the last thing we request is your nuclear umbrella."¹⁴

Another Kuwaiti paper, Ar-ra'y Al-'Amm was even more pointed: "... We must not forget that all Arab states, except.. Egypt.. have objected to the concentration of the American fleets in the Arab area's waters. Despite this, Carter did not feel embarrassed when he announced -- like the Nazi fuehrer who regarded the Danzig corridor as belonging to the reich -- in disgusting, thoughtless arrogance, he regarded the Arab land with all the Arabs in it as 'vital interests' of the United States.... The Americans, who are aware of their criminal role in the usurpation of Palestine ... want to usurp the Islamic will and to distort its aspirations by dragging it .. into the American fold and exploit it to serve American policies and goals. ... The American game of instigating the Soviets to intervene militarily in Afghanistan was completely exposed when it was ascertained how they tried to exploit their fabricated crisis with Iran in an ugly, opportunist and vulgar manner."¹⁵

In addition to Brown's revelation about the real aims of U.S. foreign and military policy, it was the case that months before Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, Zbigniew Brzezinski and the National Security Council proposed to Carter that a new "security framework" be established in the Middle East. Brzezinski wanted Carter to announce this new policy which would be as important as "the establishment of the NATO alliance" in a "major speech to the nation".¹⁶ Claiming a "Soviet invasion of Afghanistan", this major speech was finally given in the State of the Union address.

Even without a "Soviet invasion of Afghanistan", the Carter Doctrine was needed to maintain U.S. imperialism in the Middle East. When the shah of Iran was forced from his throne, and U.S. military and intelligence installations were "put out of order" by the Iranian

peoples' revolution, "the Nixon Doctrine (of relying on regional surrogate to carry out U.S. policies in a certain region) died", as a Pentagon official worded it.¹⁷ The U.S. government was left without any coherent imperialist strategy in the Middle East; and there was no immediate surrogate who could take over the shah's role. Therefore, the U.S. government had to reassert a stronger military presence.

AFGHANISTAN - A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CARTER DOCTRINE ?

As outlined above, it is incorrect to call the Soviet troop movement into Afghanistan an "invasion". Still, as a matter of principle, military involvement of one country in another must be examined very carefully. It is necessary to look at Afghanistan in the light of a conflict between major powers, i.e. the U.S. and China against the Soviet Union. However, that analysis is clearly inadequate.

In the following exposition, an attempt is made to explore the Afghan situation by looking at it in two ways: first, by examining the history of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, particularly with regards to the leftist takeover in 1978; and secondly, by exploring the role of other countries which led to the internationalization of an internal Afghan conflict.

Until 1973, Afghanistan was under a very corrupt and repressive monarchy and was one of the world's poorest

countries. In 1973, King Zaher Shah was overthrown in a popularly supported coup led by Mohammed Daoud.

Under Zaher Shah, the U.S. government had been trying hard to influence the political course of Afghanistan, and to make Afghanistan a "more non-aligned" country. Afghanistan had had traditionally close ties to the Soviet Union; the two countries have a common border of over 1,000 miles, and the Soviet Union had been Afghanistan's main military and economic partner for decades.

One attempt to make Afghanistan "more non-aligned" was through U.S. propaganda. The United States Information Service (USIS) published a daily Wireless File Bulletin, and Free World, an illustrated monthly; both publications were "distributed by USIS regularly to government officials, educators, and to special groups".

In addition, film showings were "held regularly for secondary school and university students, government officials, and the general public. Films supplied by the USIS (were) frequently presented at the palace to the King and the royal family... In 1965 approximately 200,000 persons attended the showing of USIS films".¹⁸ Undoubtedly, in a country with no TV, and only a few cinemas, such films could have a considerable impact.

Another way the U.S. government, specifically the CIA, attempted to manipulate the Afghan government, was through the Afghanistan Students Association (ASA), an organization of Afghans studying in the U.S. ASA was

In 1960, Guenther Nollau, a high ranking official of the West German Verfassungsschutz (an intelligence agency "for the protection of the constitution") went to Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey to "examine the Soviet thrust" into these countries. He summarized his observations in a book which was translated into English, and published in 1963 under the title "Russia's Southern Flank" by the CIA-connected Praeger Publishing House.

Nollau concludes in his book: "The (pro-Western) tier consisting of ... Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan is still intact. While the weakest part

of it was in Persia in 1946 and 1953, it has shifted to Afghanistan since 1955. It is not clear yet whether the tier will break at this place ... The West has means to withstand that. The support of Persia and Turkey has contributed to pushing back the Soviet influence in these countries ... The Soviet economic offensive in Afghanistan can be countered if the West gives aid under conditions as good as the Soviet aid."

Nollau's mission and book attests to the interference by NATO governments in Afghanistan long before Soviet troops entered Afghanistan.

founded in 1954 under the auspices of the American Friends of the Middle East (AFME), a CIA conduit and an organization which was self-described as promoting "a better understanding of the .. aspirations of people in other parts of the world". 19

AFME's Board of Directors included several oil corporation officials and retired State Department officers, as well as, after 1960, Kermit Roosevelt, one of the orchestrators of the 1953 CIA coup in Iran. Several years after its founding, AFME published a statement claiming that the need for an organization like AFME had increased because of the "intensifying of the Soviet propaganda in the Middle East". 20

In 1960 alone, the CIA provided AFME with nearly \$ 1 million, more than 90 per cent of its income. 21

Abdul Latif Hotaki, an Afghan student in the U.S., testified in 1967 that the CIA had tried to recruit him through Zia Noorzay, a former president of ASA. Hotaki refused to cooperate, and was subsequently harassed by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 22

Zia Noorzay himself had been introduced to the CIA by an official of AFME. Upon his return to Afghanistan, Noorzay became president of the State Treasury under King Zaher Shah. Abdul Latif Hotaki stated that a good number of ASA members who had studied in the U.S. and later became officials in the Afghan government had been "either CIA trained or indoctrinated". 23 Thus, through the ASA, the CIA cultivated future government officials who would remain beholden to the CIA.

Another former ASA president is Nake Kamrany. He commented on CIA-ASA relations: "We don't assume that all CIA people are unfriendly... If the CIA asks me for advice on any subject, I will be happy to give it." 24 As of 1978, Kamrany still lived in the U.S. He is a professor of economics and has held positions at MIT, Stanford Research Institute, and the World Bank. He is also the author of several books including "Peaceful Competition in Afghanistan" (Communication Service Co., Washington, DC, 1969).

When Mohammed Daoud took power in

1973, Afghanistan was in miserable economic shape; a situation which the U.S. government tried to exploit. This time, however, interference in Afghanistan was carried out in a massive way, and, in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, through the then-shah of Iran. The shah offered \$ 2 billion in aid to Afghanistan - for a certain price: Afghanistan had to move away from being a non-aligned country with close ties to the Soviet Union (which included military cooperation and training) to become a pro-U.S. country. Daoud accepted this conditional aid, and the shah began to exercise increasing power in Afghanistan, especially through his CIA-trained secret police, SAVAK.

In spite of this aid, Daoud did not solve his country's economic problems and was faced with mounting opposition. He tried to crush this resistance through increased repression, carried out largely under the guidance of SAVAK. In early April, 1978, one of Afghanistan's popular leftist leaders, Mir Akbar Khaiber, was assassinated by the Daoud regime. (The Afghan police were, at the time, trained and advised by West German police officers.) The dissatisfaction finally erupted in massive demonstrations in Kabul. A few days later Daoud had virtually all leftist leaders arrested. As they were about to be executed, anti-Daoud sectors of the Afghan military revolted, and ousted him. Noor Mohammed Taraki, a civilian, took power, and Babrak Karmal became Vice President.

Taraki's government reversed some of Daoud's foreign policies, and returned to close ties with the Soviet Union, which sent a large amount of aid to Afghanistan, including technical and military assistance. Concerning internal politics, the new Afghan government took drastic steps, and, in fact, enacted a revolutionary program. It initiated a badly-needed land reform, started a literacy campaign, erased most of the debts the peasants owed to their feudal masters, legalized trade unions for the first time in Afghan history, and enacted laws providing for the equality of men and women. These measures virtually eliminated the feudal system, threatened the power of the landlords, and began to eliminate

the extreme suppression of women. These new laws were perceived by the conservative clergy to be a threat to their power. As a male elite, they had in many cases been closely aligned with the feudal landlords and privileged tribal chiefs.

It does not come as a surprise that these measures met considerable resistance from the part of society which had profited the most under the King's and Daoud's feudal system. They undertook armed resistance against the Taraki government. Teachers and party officials who went out into the countryside were assassinated, and the mullahs "declared the government and party to be infidels" ²⁵ because of their ideology. Referring to the reforms, one Afghan told the New York Times that it was particularly the promotion of equal rights for women that stirred the opposition: "The moment the women were invited to the meeting the fighting started... The Government said our women had to attend meetings and our children had to go to school... this threatens our religion. We had to fight!"

The Afghan "rebel" also claimed that he and others attacked a political meeting in his village, and commented on the "punishment" for the people captured at the meeting: "Those who were just helpers (of the party) we spared. The (party) workers we did not spare. We killed them." ²⁶

Beginning in late 1978, the reforms of the Taraki government were threatened increasingly by the armed conservative opposition. In addition, the government made mistakes which alienated parts of the population. There was a growing power struggle within the government, dealing mainly with the question of how to promote reforms and how to counter the armed reaction.

Hafizullah Amin, in particular, who had taken on more and more power, including the control over the secret police and the army, was criticized for "a heavy handed approach to reforms and counterinsurgency measures". ²⁷ Amin was the director of massive, and at times brutal, counterattacks against the "rebels".

When he took complete power, ousting Taraki in September 1979, repression in Afghanistan escalated. Amin imprisoned

thousands of political opponents including his own party colleagues, and carried out a violent, cruel campaign against the "rebels" which, in turn, alienated more of the population. In short, Amin was destroying the popular gains made through the revolutionary program in 1978.

The Karmal government goes even further in their allegations against Amin. They accuse him of trying to destroy the PDP and the revolution, and of trying to set himself up as a ruler responsible to no one. In order to achieve that, the Kabul New Times charged, he began to contact one of the rebel leaders, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, in October 1979. "The talks between Amin and Hekmatyar were greatly welcomed at Langley, the CIA Headquarters." ²⁸ The New Times goes on to say that Amin was also in contact with the CIA and the Pakistani government and that he planned a coup at the end of December, 1979, for the ousting of the PDP members of his government and for establishing himself along with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as the only leaders of Afghanistan. ²⁹

It is not possible for CounterSpy to either discount or confirm these allegations. However, in an article on February 13, 1980 in the Indian Express reporter Kuldip Nayar writes from Pakistan: "He (Amin) approached Islamabad in early December. General Zia told me that Amin sent him frantic messages for an immediate meeting. He said: 'For obvious reasons, I could not have gone to meet him. I asked Mr. Agha Shahi (General Zia ul-Haq's adviser on foreign affairs) to go but the day he was to fly to Kabul the airstrip was under snow and later it was too late because the Russians had arrived.'" ³⁰

Pakistani radio reports on the day Shahi was supposed to go to Kabul (December 22) confirmed that he "could not leave Islamabad for a two day visit to Kabul due to inclement weather ... (and) it has been officially stated ... that because of Mr. Agha Shahi's prior engagements (he was scheduled to go to Saudi Arabia) he will visit Kabul on 30 and 31 December". ³¹

The Indian Express article also suggests that Amin sensed something was "in the offing", that is, while he depended

on Soviet assistance to stay in power, he knew that the Soviet government and large sectors of the PDP disagreed with his regime. Facing this opposition, Amin had to search for other allies to maintain his position. Apparently, he tried to play two cards simultaneously: he called for additional Soviet assistance including the deployment of troops on December 15 to help him stave off the immediate military opposition, and, at the same time, attempted to develop closer ties with Pakistan, and possibly even some factions of the "rebel" movement in an effort to reduce his dependence on the Soviet Union which, in his view, had become an "unreliable ally".

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CONFLICT

Until the end of 1978, the conflict in Afghanistan had been an internal struggle between the former rulers of Afghanistan and their followers, and the government and people who supported its revolutionary program. At that time, however, this internal conflict was internationalized - a change which not only escalated the fighting but also made it possible for a person like Amin to come to power. Had the internal opposition not been massively supported by other countries, and the reforms in Afghanistan been allowed to proceed peacefully, the PDP's and the Afghan Army's energy could have been directed towards internal development.

On February 2, 1979, the Washington Post reported that "Afghan dissidents are undergoing guerilla training at a base 12 miles north of Peshawar", a city in Pakistan close to the Khyber Pass which links Afghanistan with Pakistan. This camp, "a former military base ... still contains some Pakistani army vehicles and is under the guard of Pakistani soldiers". According to Pakistani officials, the people in this camp are "refugee families". Journalists who visited the camp, however, saw no women there and "the 270 men billeted at the ... camp were almost all young".³²

A similar observation was made by the Swiss Neue Zuericher Zeitung: "It is very striking ... that practically all

of the people who flee to Pakistan are male adults." The same article reported that the "refugees from Afghanistan use all they have to buy arms" and that the military government of General Zia ul-Haq had given them 20 million rupees.³³

By now it is an established fact, admitted even in the conservative Western media, that Zia ul-Haq is permitting rebel training in Pakistan, and that there are Chinese advisors training the rebels.³⁴

One might ask why Zia ul-Haq is providing massive aid to the rebels. He is faced with strong internal opposition to his brutal regime, and with the persistent struggle of the Baluchis and Pushtuns (two nationalities in the south and north of Pakistan, respectively) for self-determination and independence. Clearly, Zia ul-Haq does not need additional problems.

One probable reason for his support to the rebels is his fear of being overthrown as Daoud was in 1978. Another reason might be, that the government of China, on which Zia depends for economic and military reasons, has asked him to provide bases for the rebels in Pakistan. One might also speculate that China supports Pakistan in its efforts to build nuclear weapons; one more reason for General Zia not to alienate the Chinese.

(In August 1979, the Carter administration stopped all military aid to Pakistan because of that country's nuclear program. At the time, covert operations by the CIA to "disable the Pakistani uranium enrichment facility" were debated in the U.S. government, but were later supposedly ruled out.³⁵)

U.S. AID TO THE REBELS

Until the U.S. media confirmed in January 1980 that the U.S. government was in fact aiding the rebels, this was a hotly debated question. Carter administration spokespersons denied charges of U.S. aid to the rebels often repeated in the Afghan and Eastern European press as "slandorous and baseless".³⁶ Said State Department spokesperson, Tom Reston in June 1979: "I deny that any U.S. personnel or arms

were being used in the training and equipment of Afghan rebels in Pakistan or any place else." ³⁷

Either Reston had not been told, or he lied. Already on January 13, 1979, an Indian daily, The Patriot, revealed that "a special CIA cell has been set up in the American Embassy in Islamabad and the American Consulate-General in Karachi under the overall command of R. Lessard ... The Lessard Task Force has reportedly been given the task of organizing extremely secret and sensitive operations both in Iran and Afghanistan. The recent spurt in counter-revolutionary activities on the Pak-Afghan border is apparently the handiwork of this team". ³⁸

Research done by CounterSpy has confirmed that Robert P. Lessard, listed as "Second Secretary" of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, is in fact a CIA officer. He has been assigned previously to Afghanistan, and, for the exceptionally long time of ten years, to Iran under the shah. Other CIA officers in Islamabad include John J. Reagan (He has served in Indonesia, Hong Kong, and Malaya) and David E. Thurman (who worked in Karachi, Pakistan for three years before being transferred to Islamabad). A CIA officer in Karachi is Richard B. Jackman, who served previously in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Abu Dhabi.

Subsequent to official denials, it was confirmed that the U.S. had been aiding the rebels by someone who should know: Paul Nitze, President Carter's adviser on Afghanistan. Nitze is a member of the right-wing Committee on the Present Danger, and, according to Harper's magazine "has been involved in almost every major effort to jump up the defense budget since 1949". ³⁹

In October, 1979, Paul Nitze stated that the "unrest" in Afghanistan is "due to Red Chinese, Pakistani and U.S. aid to the rebels". He further said that Zbigniew Brzezinski wanted to give aid more openly to the rebels in early 1979. According to Nitze, it took some doing to convince Brzezinski that such openness was inappropriate. ⁴⁰

The question of aid to the Afghan insurgents is one more indication of the extent of the U.S. propaganda effort regarding Afghanistan. The Carter ad-

ministration, as the facts and Nitze's statement prove, is deliberately misinforming the people in the U.S., and lying about one of the most important factors in the present conflict in Afghanistan.

On January 9, 1980, Birch Bayh, Chairperson of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, confirmed Nitze's statement indirectly on NBC-TV's "Today" show by answering the question whether the U.S. government has in any way been trying to help the rebels: "... when a significant number of people in Afghanistan were determined to try to exert themselves and to try to have some say in what kind of government Afghanistan should have, and not have it imposed upon them by Soviets, we did take certain steps to help them do what any group of citizens should be able to do in a country". ⁴¹ Bayh refused to elaborate further.

On February 15, 1980, the Washington Post confirmed that the Carter administration had decided to support the rebels by sending them arms presumably through the CIA. The Post reported that "U.S. covert aid prior to the December invasion ... was limited to funneling small amounts of medical supplies and communications equipment to scattered rebel tribes, plus what is described as 'technical advice' to the rebels about where they could acquire arms on their own". ⁴²

U.S. governmental officials are also continuously in contact with some of the "rebel leaders". One of these is Ziya Nezri, a supporter of the monarchy, who had discussions with State Department officials in early March 1979.

Another "rebel leader" is Zia Khan Nassry, who, like Nezri, is a naturalized U.S. citizen. He comes from a rich Afghan family; his father was governor of the northeastern Paktia province, and his father-in-law, Abdul Rezag Khan, was head of the Afghan Air Force under the King for 20 years until 1973. Nassry himself claims that early this year he helped organize a "group called Gazi, a coalition of displaced Afghans dedicated to harassment of the Soviets". An article in the February 4, 1980 Daily Telegraph (London) stated that "Gazi had been responsible for damaging Soviet buildings in Paris and Brussels". ⁴³

Nassry, who represents the Afghanistan Islamic Nationalist Revolutionary Council has received support from the Rockefeller funded Asia Society. (One of the Asia Society's recent new members is former CIA director William Colby.) David Chaffetz of the Asia Society writes that he helped map out Nassry's travel plans and prepared a briefing paper entitled "Afghanistan: Russia's Vietnam ?" for Nassry's use in his propaganda work. 44

An interview with Nassry was also printed in the April 1980 issue of Soldier of Fortune, a U.S. magazine for mercenaries. In this interview, Nassry tells Soldier of Fortune that his "rebel movement" is willing to recruit mercenaries through a Washington, DC contact. 45

Another U.S. based representative of the "rebels" is Bashir Zikria, of the Afghan National Front, who is a professor at Columbia University. After returning from a two months visit to the rebel camps, Zikria was a guest of WNET/WETA's MacNeil/Lehrer Report in August 1979. Zikria assured the viewers that the "rebels" believe "that it is inevitable that (they) win" and that over 16,000 "rebels" are "moving towards Kabul". 46

The "rebel representatives" in the U.S. conduct a fairly effective propaganda campaign. Most of the arms, however, are apparently being given to the rebels in Pakistan rather than being channeled through these representatives in the U.S. As the Boston Globe reports, "for days, Arthur Hummel, the American Ambassador in Pakistan has been urging that government to turn its back while the United States smuggles arms to the insurgents". 47

THE AFGHAN REFUGEES

One way foreign aid is reaching the Afghan rebels is through the "refugee channel". While there can be no doubt that there are refugees fleeing the armed conflicts in Afghanistan, their plight has been exploited and their number has been exaggerated. For example, the Washington Post reported on January 24, 1980 that there were

600,000 refugees in Pakistan. At the same time, "rebel leader" Nassry put the figure at 300,000.

A good number of refugees - 50 per cent might be a good guess - are in fact nomads, who normally go to Pakistan each winter. The U.S. media has chosen to distort this fact. In an editorial on January 28, 1980 the Washington Post bemoaned: "A little girl, a look of confusion and doubt on her face, carrying a barefoot infant on her back .. the pictures come from camps in Pakistan where masses of refugees from Afghanistan are gathering." 48 The Post was referring to a UPI picture it had carried on the front page on January 26.

An Afghan interviewed by CounterSpy in March, 1980, found this ridiculous. According to him, one can recognize from the little girl's features that she belongs to a nomadic tribe which would be in Pakistan each winter.

Some of the "refugee camps", as stated in the Neue Zuercher Zeitung (see above) are in fact military training centers. Others are made up almost exclusively of women and children who have been brought out of Afghanistan in order to free their men to join the fighting. "Refugees" interviewed by William Branigan of the Washington Post "said they were bringing their women and children out and seeking arms and ammunition". 49

It is also hardly ever reported that some "refugees" were forced to leave Afghanistan by their landlords, who, using the deeply rooted feudalist mentality, were able to convince peasants that it was their duty to follow their landlords who went to Pakistan after having their fiefdoms expropriated as part of the land reform.

It is of note, also, that a delegation comprised of representatives of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and CARE visited some of the "refugee camps" in February 1980. Both IRC and CARE have collaborated with the CIA during the U.S. war in Vietnam. When the elders of the Afghan refugees told the IRC-CARE delegation that they were determined "to free their homeland from foreign occupation", the delegation assured them that "the people of the United States ... understood their

plight and they were providing assistance for their succor". 50

Another expression of planned support for the "refugees" occurred on February 13, 1980, when Mary Ann Dubs, the widow of Ambassador Adolph Dubs who was killed in Kabul in February 1979, and Robert Neumann, announced the establishment of the Afghanistan Relief Committee (ARC). Neumann served as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan under King Zaher Shah from 1966-73, and is now a senior associate of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, which is closely linked to the CIA.

The ARC (with Sen. Clairborne Pell, of the right-wing Freedom House, as honorary chairperson) plans to raise \$10 million to aid the refugees. ARC's Chairperson is John Train, a prominent investment counsellor and columnist for Forbes magazine. The ARC's Washington representative is William McClulloch. In the 1960's he worked as an economic advisor to King Zaher Shah's regime.

Interviewed by a West German journalist in March, 1980 McClulloch said that the aid for the refugees is being collected "only because it's really needed"; but when he was asked what he thought about charges that this aid will actually end up helping the "rebels", he replied: "I certainly would hope so."

According to McClulloch, the aid collected by the ARC will be distributed through organizations like IRC and Catholic Relief Service (another relief organization that has worked closely with the CIA). In addition, ARC representatives will shuttle back and forth from Pakistan to the U.S. and supervise the aid process.

Emphasizing that he was expressing his personal views rather than those of ARC, McClulloch also harshly criticized President Carter's handling of the Afghanistan situation. He asserted that the only way to solve the crisis was to strengthen the rebels in any way possible, and simultaneously influence the Soviet Central Asian republics - with their large Muslim populations - by attempting to destabilize them; through increased radio broadcasts asking them to rise up, and by "parachuting people

in and letting them set off plastic bombs". McClulloch suggested that this was the only way to get the Soviet government to negotiate about a withdrawal.

Yet another organization aiding the refugees is Afghanistan Relief, sponsored by the Orange County based California International Christian Aid, headed by Robert Poudrier. He claims that he was on a "relief mission" in Afghanistan on January 18-23. Most of his aid is apparently being funnelled through Zia Nassry.⁵¹

While there is legitimate human concern for these Afghans being forced to leave their country, it is obvious that most of the aid to the refugees, either directly or indirectly, is in fact supporting the reactionary rebel movement. This fact is highlighted when the aid is provided by people and organizations who support the "rebel movement" and/or have a history of working with the CIA.

CARE, IRC and CRS officials are not the only ones in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area ostensibly aiding the refugees. There is also Louis Dupree, who lived in Kabul for many years until he was accused of being a CIA agent, arrested, and forced to leave the country in 1979. Dupree, an anthropologist and expert on Afghanistan, wrote a lengthy article on Afghanistan in the July/August 1979 issue of Problems of Communism, published by the U.S. International Communication Agency (ICA). Dupree now lives in Peshawar where he works closely with the "rebels" and with the U.S. government.

Continued aid to the rebels via the refugees has, in fact, been suggested by Zbigniew Brzezinski when he visited a refugee camp in Pakistan in early February, 1980. Brzezinski expressed the confidence that the refugees "would be able to go back to their homes one day" and pledged that they "were not alone".⁵²

Brzezinski had gone to Pakistan on February 1, to negotiate a \$ 400 million aid package to Pakistan, which included \$ 200 million over two years in military loans, badly needed economic aid (Pakistan's foreign debt is over \$ 7 billion) and a reaffirmation of "U.S. security commitments" to protect Pakistan from "Soviet aggression".

However, in what was described as a "new blow to U.S. diplomacy" ⁵³ the Pakistani military ruler eventually rejected the aid package because he did not want to be accused of being a "surrogate of the United States" ⁵⁴ vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and India. (The Indian government has pointed out that U.S. arms to Pakistan have been used against India but never against the Soviet Union in the past.)

Zia ul-Haq is obviously afraid of

the repercussions that U.S. aid - massive and visible, but, in his opinion, not sufficient - could have. As mentioned, there are two independence movements in Pakistan as well as strong opposition against Zia's brutal regime. A few days before Brzezinski arrived in Pakistan, pro-Soviet demonstrations took place in Baluchistan. ⁵⁵

Refusing the proposed aid package (which does not, however, mean refus-

The Pakistani police officers, listed below, have attended CIA connected police training programs in the United States, which were conducted under the office of Public Safety (OPS).

A major focus of these OPS programs was the creation of a nationally coordinated police force under a unified command which would be able to deal more effectively with "problems" than scattered local police forces. Officers were trained in various skills, including communications, interrogation, intelligence gathering, riot control, handling of explosives, infiltration, etc. Another key element in these programs was training in psychological warfare.

In addition, for the CIA, the OPS served as an excellent field for recruitment and for extending the "CIA infrastructure" in any given country.

Athar, Muhammad (in the U.S. from 8/68-10/68); Azeri, G. Selvamony (5/68-12/68); Aziz-ul Huq (8/68-12/68); Bakhsk, Khuda (10/68-1/69); Chowdhury, Musa Miyan (6/70-10/70); Din, Alaf (11/69-5/70); Diwan, Muhammad Sabet (10/68-2/69); Haider, M.S. (3/68-6/68); Hakim, S.A. (4/70-7/70); Haque, A.K.M. Enamul (10/69-5/70)

Haque, A.K.M. Mahbubul (12/68-5/69); Haque, Mojibul (5/70-12/70); Haque, Mozammel (2/69-9/69); Haque, Muhammad Majmul (7/67-11/67); Haque, Nizamul (2/67-7/67); Haque, Zafar-ul (6/60-10/70); Hashem, Syed Md Abdul (4/67-9/67); Hassan, Muhammed Mujtaba (8/68-12/68); Huq, M. Enamul (7/68-11/68);

Husnain, Raza (6/69-10/69); Hussain, Ata (4/69-7/69); Hussain, S.L. (no

time given); Iqbal, K.D. Zafer (10/69-12/69); Islam A.H. Nurul (8/68-11/68); Jabbar, Mir Abdul (no time given); Kamal, Abdul (5/67-9/67); Khaleque Khan, Abdul (6/70-10/70); Khalil, Ahmad (10/68-2/69); Khan, Dil Jan (no time given);

Khan, Habibur Rehman (5/67-9/67); Khan, Muhammad Asghar (3/73-5/73); Khan, Muhammad Aziz (6/73-10/73); Khan, Sajjad Ali (6/70-10/70); Khan, Shafiullah (1/69-2/69 - he received training in the FBI National Academy); Khasru, Syed Amir (8/68-11/68); Leghari, Noor Ilahi Khan (no time given); Mahmood, Fazal (10/68-2/69);

Mahmood, Saiyid Ahmad (7/68-11/68); Malik, Sher Ali (5/70-12/70); Mohmand, Gohar Z. (2/71-6/71); Murshed, Ghulam (8/68-12/68); Muslehuddin, A.K.M. (10/68-2/69); Mustafa, Hassan (6/69-10/69); Nagra, S.A. (6/69-10/69); Najmuddin, Dilshad (2/71-6/71); Quereshi, Zafar Hussain (3/67-9/67); Rahim, Abdur (2/71-6/71)

Rahman Khan, Obaid-ur (8/70-6/71); Rahman, M.H. (11/68-3/69); Rashid, Nasim Ahmad (5/68-12/68); Rauf, Mohamed Mohiuddin Ali (8/68-12/68); Razaq, Abdul (5/70-12/70); Rehman, A.M.M. Aminur (4/69-7/69); Rizvi, Iqbal Hussain (10/68-12/68); Rizvi, Iqbal Hussain (no time given); Safdar, Abul Bashar Sharfunddin (2/71-6/71);

Sayood, S.A. (3/68-7/68); Shah, Jamil Haider (1/69-3/69); Shahjahan, A.S.M. (6/69-10/69); Sheikh, Muhammad Akram (3/68-6/68); Sheikh, Saghir Husein (7/68-11/68); Siddiqi, Fazal Ellahi (7/67-11/67); Syed, Anwar Gilani (10/68-2/69); Zaidi, Syed Tahir Raza (1/69-3/69);

ing U.S. aid in general), Zia ul-Haq wants arrangements "on the basis of lower visibility" of U.S. aid.⁵⁶ At the same time, Zia is seeking aid from Muslim countries, China, Western Europe, and Japan, which has already promised \$ 130 million.

Conservative Muslim countries are not only increasing their support for the Pakistani dictatorship, they are also stepping up their aid to the Afghan rebels. An Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers - boycotted by several countries - condemned Soviet "military aggression" toward Afghanistan.

Even though there was no resolution at the conference regarding direct aid to the rebels, there are strong indications that several countries - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Oman - are providing them with support. The West German news agency DPA reported that "five Arab states ... committed themselves to support the Afghanistan rebels with money and arms. ... Among other things, the two fishing ports of Gwadar and Pasny along Pakistan's Baluchistan coast (will) be extended (as well as) existing airports in Baluchistan. ... Harbors and airports are to be used as collecting points for aid consignments not only for Afghan refugees but also for Afghan freedom fighters".⁵⁷

EGYPT'S ROLE

Egypt has been the most open in its direct support for the "freedom fighters", although it was not allowed to participate in the Islamic Conference because of its collaboration with the Begin regime in the Camp David accords. (The conference even called upon all Muslim countries to "consider joining in boycotting the Egyptian regime".⁵⁸)

On January 24, 1980, Egyptian Defense Minister General Kamal Hasan Ali announced that "army camps have been opened for the training of Afghan rebels" and that rebels are being supplied with weapons from Egypt.⁵⁹

Egypt has large stockpiles of Soviet

weapons, such as heat-seeking SA7 shoulder-fired air defense missiles and RPG antitank rocket launchers. "It is understood", writes the Boston Globe, that Anwar Sadat "could be persuaded to turn these weapons over to the United States in exchange for modern American replacements".⁶⁰

These weapons would come in handy - they could be supplied to the rebels who could, in turn, claim they got them from defecting Afghan soldiers or captured them. The Sadat regime, friend of the ex-shah of Iran, is clearly doing some of the dirty work for the U.S. by providing training for the Afghan rebels. The Carter Doctrine has found a good, new puppet in Sadat.

CHINA'S ROLE

The rebels, and the U.S. government, have discovered another close friend: the Chinese government. China's aid to the rebels is a well-known fact. On his visit to Pakistan in January 1980, Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua promised tribal leaders that his country would help "curb Soviet expansionism".⁶¹

There have also been reports that "Chinese irregulars" and "Pakistani soldiers ... wearing typical Afghan clothes have been fighting along with the rebels".⁶²

The collaboration of China and the U.S. in Afghanistan is no accident; a Pentagon study, entitled "Asian Security in the 1980's", published by the Rand Corporation as a "product of a conference of Asian and U.S. government analysts" held in January 1979, recommends that in light of the "continued growth in the Soviet threat" the "loose coalition" of NATO and China should be developed into a "security relationship".⁶³

Afghanistan might be a good test case for such a "security relationship". Even before Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown went to China in January of this year, it was learned that he "is under instructions to discuss with Chinese leaders ... what arms they can provide to the rebels". It was suggested China "could provide light mortars, antitank land mines and machine-

guns with incendiary bullets". 64

Brown's visit to China was very successful. Even though a formal "security relationship" between China and the U.S. might be many years away, important first steps were made. They include a coordination of aid to the Afghan rebels and the Pakistani dictatorship, and the increased sale of U.S. military equipment (excluding arms) to China. Influential members of Congress, like Senate Majority leader Robert Byrd have urged the sale of arms to China.

In a meeting in mid-March, the U.S. and Chinese governments agreed to "pursue separate but "mutually reinforcing" efforts to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.... According to Chinese sources", the Washington Post reports, "a discussion in broad terms of aid to the rebels produced an understanding that both Washington and Peking will do what they can to provide assistance." 65

Invited by Harold Brown, China's Defense Minister Xu Xiangqian will visit the U.S. in late spring, and Reginald Bartholomew, the State Department's director of politico-military affairs, will go to China in April or May.

(On his China trip, Harold Brown was accompanied by Undersecretary of Defense, Robert Komer. Komer has been playing an increasingly important role in the Pentagon. During the 14 years he spent working for the CIA he was appointed to head the pacification program in Vietnam in 1967, and founded the CIA's Operation Phoenix. He worked through 5,000 U.S. advisers, 75 per cent of them military and 25 per cent civilian, including CIA personnel. 66 Through Phoenix, Komer was responsible for countless assassinations and cases of torture. After some years with the Rand Corporation, he was called back to the Pentagon by President Carter in 1977.)

THE "INVASION" AND THE U.S. MEDIA

The recent events in Afghanistan are being manipulated for several purposes by the Carter administration. In order to maintain the interventionist mood

in the U.S. created after the seizure of U.S. hostages by Iranian militants, the U.S. government must continue a sustained media campaign about the Soviet "invasion" of Afghanistan. And in the government's terms, this campaign has been going well.

In a manner identical to briefings in Saigon during the Vietnam war, it started with reports about the "invasion". In the final days of December 1979, U.S. reporters began receiving most of their information from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, according to the Ottawa Sunday Post. An embassy officer provided special briefings restricted to American journalists. One reporter recalls that "it didn't take long to realize that this guy did not really know what in hell was happening out in the countryside". 67

In one of these briefings it was announced that "a vital highway had been mined by rebels and at least 60 vehicles had been destroyed". Two journalists arrived late to the briefing, having travelled on the highway in question, and they hadn't seen a single destroyed vehicle. 68

Another U.S. Embassy report announced that an entire Soviet division had been rushed to the Afghan-Iranian border. "Details of the size, strength and equipment were given and the story had instantaneous repercussions in Washington, Moscow, and Teheran. The truth is that the division had never moved from Kabul." 69

One issue that is brought up repeatedly in the propaganda campaign by the U.S. media is the use of napalm and chemical weapons by the Soviet and Afghan troops. Proof has never been offered of the use of either napalm or chemical weapons, and even Hodding Carter had to admit that the State Department is "not able to establish conclusively that poison gas has been used in Afghanistan". 70

On this point, an interesting article appeared on February 9, 1980 in the Toronto Globe and Mail. Victor Malarek, their correspondent in Peshawar, reported that he witnessed an Australian TV crew actually stage a scene in the headquarters of the Islamic Party in Peshawar (one of the "rebel" groups), in order to portray

Over a year after the event, the State Department has finally released an official report about the kidnapping and killing of the late U.S. Ambassador to Kabul Duhs who was killed on February 14, 1979 (discussed in the last issue of CounterSpy). The New York Times observes that the State Department's account "omits and therefore covers up several important aspects"; and contains information that was not recorded in a detailed log of the events which was kept by the Department's Office for Combating Terrorism.

For example, two days after the kidnapping, new messages were entered in the log "specifying that Mr. Amstutz (then deputy Ambassador) had been asked to seek contact with the Soviet Embassy in Kabul to intercede with the Afghan police". According to the New York Times, an official who monitored all the message traffic at the time, commented: "I never saw that message go out." (New York Times, 2/21/80, p.A-9)

As the State Department report points out, there are still questions as of yet unanswered by the Afghan authorities. However, it should be noted that the report carefully avoids references to conscious omissions made by U.S. officials which might have prevented the tragic outcome of events of February 14, 1979.

the "freedom fighters" in an appealing way. Malarek writes: "And what is obvious ... is that many of (the journalists) are inventing stories and shooting 'action' films and photographs that rightly should be captioned 'simulated'". Malarek also quotes a journalist from the Netherlands: "Who cares if there's a bit of show? Anyway, these Afghans ... could use a little help."; and a UPI reporter: "There's a lot of bull going on. It's too bad. But what can you do?".⁷¹

The CIA itself has interjected itself into the Afghan media campaign. In early March, CIA director Stansfield Turner wrote a letter to Sen. Lloyd Bentsen and gave him permission to publish it. The letter appeared "to re-

flect a concerted effort by the (CIA) to expose Soviet-backed brutality".⁷² It contained allegations about instances of "aggravated rape .. some resulting in the victim's death" and other "reports" about Afghan and Soviet atrocities. As in the questionable media reports, Turner's allegations were admittedly insufficiently documented.

THE "REBELS" - WHO THEY REALLY ARE

Generally, the U.S. government and the U.S. media have tried to portray all Afghans as hating the Soviets, and the rebels as "fierce Muslim fighters". If one takes a good look at who the rebel leaders really are, one gets quite a different picture.

One of the most important "rebel" leaders - head of the National Liberation Front of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan - is Sayed Ahmed Gailani. Gailani, who has close ties to King Zaher Shah, was the owner of a large Peugeot dealership in Kabul. Since December 1978 he has lived in a spacious villa in Peshawar. Gailani is an "urbane aristocrat whose ancestral lands in Jalalabad have ... been confiscated", and receives much of his aid from wealthy Saudi citizens.⁷³

The majority of Gailani's followers belong to the different Pathan tribes living in the northwestern part of Afghanistan. They are the largest nationality in Afghanistan.

The Pathans are traditionally producers of opium. About 300 tons of opium were produced in Afghanistan in 1979 (compared to 15 tons in Mexico), most of it in Pathan areas. Pathan leaders have become wealthy by selling and smuggling opium - a practice that was severely restricted under the governments of Taraki and Amin leading to considerable armed reaction. Interestingly enough, large quantities of Afghan opium are now appearing on the East Coast of the U.S.

Another "rebel" leader is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, head of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, the most extreme fundamentalist group. Hekmatyar, who says that his party is based in the intelligentsia,

rejects even King Zaher Shah as being too "left-wing". So far, Hekmatyar has resisted all calls for "rebel" unity, including those from the deposed King, who has been living in Italy since 1973, and recently urged the "rebel" leaders to "unite immediately" in order to "achieve unity in goal and action".⁷⁴

Hekmatyar claims that "among the refugees there are more than 250,000 people linked to (the Islamic Party)".⁷⁵ The Washington Post writes that out of six major "rebel" groups Hekmatyar's group is "the largest and best organized".⁷⁶ However, "rebel" leader Gailani claims that 70 per cent of the fighters are under his command.⁷⁷

According to Le Monde Diplomatique, limited resistance to the Afghan government also comes from some tribes in the south, and from two Maoist parties in the northwest, which are about ten years old and receive support from a small part of the population.⁷⁸

Given the variety of "rebel" organizations (including bandit groups who pose as "rebels"), their lack of a disciplined strategy and disorganization, it proves difficult for the CIA and other aid donors to decide whom to help. Arms are a major source of income for some "rebels", and a good number of the arms supplied to fight the Soviets are likely to show up one day in the hands of people in Pakistan fighting Zia ul-Haq.

Many "rebels" also use the "holy war" to enrich themselves. Zia Nassry described the problem himself: "On one occasion tribesmen captured a number of (light tanks), drove them home and refused to give them to us. ... I had to get the religious leaders to talk to the tribesmen and tell them it was their religious responsibility to give us the tanks to fight a holy war."⁷⁹

Nick Downey of the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), who spent four months with rebel groups in Afghanistan, said that "they were bitterly divided..., give little thought to events outside their province, and (are) fighting to retain their feudal system and stop the Kabul government's left-wing reforms which (are) considered anti-Islamic".⁸⁰

The U.S. State Department - as duly recorded in the media - claims that

The following officials, presently assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, are CIA officers.

ALEXANDER, Joseph N.
(Attache)

born: 7/26/1930

He has served previously in Sudan, England, Bolivia, Taiwan, and Indonesia.

LONG, Arnold C.
(Second Secretary)

born: 12/30/1943

Long has worked in Calcutta and New Dehli, India, before he came to Afghanistan.

MARIK, Warren J.
(Vice-Consul)

born: 6/30/1945

Marik has served previously in Turkey.

TURCO, Frederick A.
(First Secretary)

born: 7/10/1938

Turco has been assigned to Bangladesh; Rawalpindi, Pakistan; and Calcutta, India.

the "rebels" are inflicting heavy casualties on the Soviet and Afghan armies. However, after over three months of fighting, little gain by the "rebels" can be seen. In fact, it appears that the Afghan government with the help of Soviet troops, has been able to maintain control of most of the country.⁸¹

Contrary to many U.S. press reports, it seems that the role of the Soviet army in Afghanistan is largely limited to supporting the Afghan army, which carries out most of the duties.

Unrest - the strike of shopkeepers and, for one day, of governmental workers - was reported in Kabul shortly after February 20, the deadline President Carter had set for complete withdrawal of Soviet troops. This strike was accompanied by armed demonstrations, lootings and burnings of shops and governmental buildings.

According to the Afghan government, the unrest was instigated by "agents and saboteurs" paid by the U.S., China, and Pakistan. In any case, the city calmed down soon; a demonstration set

for February 29 never materialized, and the Afghan army and a newly created peoples' militia controlled the city again, while the Soviet troops engaged only in the protection of the Soviet Embassy and areas where Soviet civilians live.⁸²

The U.S. media seized on the unrest in Kabul as new proof of massive opposition to the government of Babrak Karmal. In reporting the disturbances, however, journalists had to rely on rumors and second-hand reports, since they were restricted to the Intercontinental Hotel at the time.

By all accounts, it appears to be very unlikely that the Afghan "rebel movement" will be able to gain control over the country. Other than a very peculiar branch of Islam, opposition to reforms, and hatred of Communism, the rebels have little to offer to the Afghan people.

What happens in Afghanistan in the coming months and years depends a lot on the U.S. government, China, and Pakistan. The U.S. activity that can affect the course of events most is the continued or increased support

of the "rebels" with weapons and logistics. Should the U.S. and other countries end their intervention, the Afghan revolutionary program, though badly damaged under Amin, would take its course.

Most likely, the rebel activities would die down, the Soviet troops could be withdrawn, the Afghan government would be able to promote and enact urgently necessary reforms, assist the peasants in the spring sowing, set up health programs, and further the democratization of society.

Given U.S. governmental interests, it is not likely that U.S. intervention will end soon. For the U.S. government it is a small effort to aid the "rebels". And, Carter administration officials have vowed repeatedly that they want to make the Soviet "invasion" as costly as possible.

As it looks now, the Afghan revolution will have to deal with foreign aggression for a long time.

FOOTNOTES

In February 1980, the Pakistan National Trade Union Federation sent a message to the Afghan trade unions pledging support for the people and the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and expressing its willingness to establish closer working relations with the Afghan unions.

Another organization supporting the revolution in Afghanistan is the Pakistan-Afghanistan Friendship Society. It recently released a statement protesting the military training of "Afghan counter-revolutionary forces" in Pakistan.

Likewise, the Organization of Progressive Pakistanis called for an "End to subversion in Afghanistan; withdrawal of all facilities ..given to 'refugees', and their repatriation back to Afghanistan; (and) closure of all 'guerilla' bases inside Pakistan" at its September, 1979 convention in New York. (see: Pakistan Progressive P.O.Box 8, Cathedral Station, New York, NY 10025)

- 1) Washington Post (WP), 1/5/80, p. A-7
- 2) The Sunday Times, London, 1/20/80 p.1
- 3) WP, 2/23/80, p.A-10
- 4) Indian Express, 2/13/80, p.6; as quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Middle East & North Africa (FBIS, ME & NA), 2/21/80, p.S-1
- 5) Washington Star (WS), 12/27/79, p. A-1
- 6) The Sunday Times, London, 1/6/80
- 7) New York Times (NYT), 1/24/80, p. A-1
- 8) Kabul New Times (KNT), 1/1/80, p.1
- 9) Times, London 1/5/80, p.4
- 10) Wall Street Journal (WSJ), 1/7/80, p.12
- 11) WP, 1/24/80, p.A-12
- 12) as quoted in The Nation, 3/8/80, p. 263
- 13) NYT, 1/11/80, p.A-8
- 14) as quoted in FBIS, ME & NA, 1/25/80, p.C-1
- 15) as quoted in FBIS, ME & NA, 1/31/80, pp. C-1, C-2
- 16) WP, 1/24/80, p.A-14

- 17) ibid.
- 18) Harvey E. Smith, Area Handbook for Afghanistan, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1969, pp.235,236
- 19) American Friends of the Middle East, 4th Annual Report, New York
- 20) ibid.
- 21) Rampart's, April 1967, pp.24-26
- 22) WP, 3/30/67, p.A-10
- 23) cf supra, # 21
- 24) ibid.
- 25) Time, 12/18/78, p.41
- 26) NYT, 2/9/80, p.A-3
- 27) International Herald Tribune (IHT), 9/17/79, p.1
- 28) KNT, 1/22/80, pp.1,2
- 29) KNT, 1/27/80, pp.1,2
- 30) cf supra, # 4
- 31) as quoted in FBIS, ME & NA, 12/26/79 p.S-11
- 32) WP, 2/2/79, p.A-23
- 33) Neue Zuercher Zeitung (NZZ), 2/7/79, p.4
- 34) see WS, 4/30/79, p.A-3; NYT, 4/16/79, p.A-1; WP 4/23/79, p.A-16
- 35) NYT, 8/12/79, p.A-13; NYT, 8/24/79, p.A-24; new left review, no.119, p.26
- 36) WP, 4/3/79, p.A-12
- 37) NYT, 6/12/79, p.A-5
- 38) The Patriot (India), 1/13/79, p.2
- 39) Harper's, June 1977, p.64
- 40) as quoted in a soon to be released WHUR (Howar University, Washington, DC) radio show to be distributed over the National Public Radio's Independent Channel. Check your local radio program guide.
- 41) as quoted in WP, 2/15/80, p.A-28
- 42) WP, 2/15/80, p.A-28
- 43) as quoted in Call-Chronicle (Allentown, PA), 2/24/80, p.A-4
- 44) David Chaffetz, Afghanistan-Russia's Vietnam ?, The Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society, Special Paper # 4, summer 1979
- 45) Soldier of Fortune, April 1980, p.45
- 46) MacNeil/Lehrer Report, # 5032, transcript, p.2
- 47) Boston Globe, 1/5/80, p.2
- 48) WP, 1/28/80, p.A-22
- 49) WP, 1/26/80, p.A-20
- 50) as quoted in FBIS, ME & NA, 2/20/80, p.S-9
- 51) cf supra, # 43
- 52) as quoted in FBIS, ME & NA, 2/4/80, p.S-20
- 53) WP, 3/8/80, p.A-21
- 54) ibid.
- 55) WP, 1/23/80, p.A-25
- 56) WP, 3/8/80, p.A-21
- 57) DPA, 2/1/80, as quoted in FBIS, ME & NA, 2/5/80, p.A-1
- 58) as quoted in FBIS, ME & NA, 2/12/80, p.S-19
- 59) MENA, Cairo, as quoted in FBIS, ME & NA, 1/25/80, p.D-5
- 60) cf supra, # 47
- 61) WS, 1/21/80, p.A-1
- 62) Indian Express, as quoted in FBIS, ME & NA, 2/12/80, p.S-7
- 63) WS, 12/28/79, p.A-3
- 64) cf supra, # 47
- 65) WP, 3/21/80, p.A-29
- 66) The Sunday Oklahoman, 3/25/73, p.1
- 67) The Sunday Post (Ottawa), 2/17/80
- 68) ibid.
- 69) ibid.
- 70) In the State Department daily briefing, 3/5/80
- 71) Globe and Mail (Toronto), 2/9/80, p.1
- 72) WP, 3/10/80, p.A-18
- 73) Afzal Khan, "With the Afghan Rebels", NYT magazine, 1/13/80, pp. 32, 33
- 74) AFP, 1/4/80, as quoted in FBIS, ME & NA, 1/4/80, p.S-6
- 75) FBIS, ME & NA, 2/6/80, p.S-8
- 76) WP, 1/26/80, p.A-16
- 77) Der Spiegel, 1/21/80, p.112
- 78) Le Monde Diplomatique, 2/80
- 79) cf supra, # 45, p.44
- 80) as quoted in FBIS, ME & NA, 12/31/79, p.S-13
- 81) cf supra, # 70
- 82) NYT, 2/29/80, p.A-7

CIA IN AMERICA

by John Kelly

(Ed. note: The following are intended excerpts from a forthcoming book, The CIA in America, by John Kelly, to be published by Lawrence Hill and Company. The excerpts are but a sampling of the books overwhelming evidence that the CIA treats the United States as an "enemy nation", penetrating all sectors of society in its attempt to achieve its devious ends.)

C.I.A. - POLICE

The CIA's politicization of U.S. police forces was epitomized in the case of the Chicago police. Initiation of this relationship came from the CIA as seen in a memo of August 11, 1967 to then DCI Richard Helms from Howard J. Osborn with the concurrence of R. L. Bannerman. According to the memo, Helms had approved bringing together U.S. officials for a police liaison seminar "to promote an exchange of views on mutual problems..." (The memo said that the exact agenda was attached, but this attachment has not been released by the CIA.)

The memo suggested that Helms host a dinner for the police officials; that stand-by aircraft be always available; and finally that the police officials be personally briefed about the importance of concealing the identity of the CIA base. James E. Conlisk, then superintendent of the Chicago Police Department (CPD) accepted an invitation to this seminar.

Osborn responded to Conlisk's acceptance with a letter indicating that "Mr. Helms has a keen, personal interest in our meeting and ... will host a dinner in your honor..." Osborn also advised that the CIA would make all the arrangements; that a CIA agent would accompany Conlisk on his flight; and that fishing, swimming, tennis and golf facilities would be available.

With this type of treatment, it was not surprising that Conlisk later wrote Helms to state: "I should very

much like to avail this Department (CPD) of the opportunity of an evaluation of our procedures and advice and counsel in areas which you suggested."

Conlisk's next sentence indicated that he invited the CIA for political operations. To wit: "The recent announcement that this city will be the site of the Democratic National Convention in August, 1968, suggests to me that the city may well experience a substantial measure of activity in sensitive areas for some considerable period of time prior to that event. I am, therefore, anxious to move as expeditiously as possible in order to provide for every contingency."

A month later, Helms, apologizing for his delay, wrote Conlisk that two CIA officers would be going to Chicago.

Helms himself briefed these two CIA officers, indicating the significance attached to this mission by the CIA. Helms' briefing also spoke to the mission's political objectives in that it was suppose to pass on to local police spy units the lessons from the so-called racial riots in Detroit and Newark in 1967. The briefing also revealed that Helms wanted to transplant the CIA's foreign police operations to the U.S. "As a concerned citizen, Mr. Helms felt that the experience and the techniques that the CIA has developed in foreign intelligence operations should be made available to law enforcement agencies in this country."

As known, the CIA's foreign police operations have been clearly political, extra-legal, and involved in crimes such as the creation of assassination squads. Helms, himself, was personally involved in the formation of the charming entity known as SAVAK. Apparently, he and the CIA wanted to do for the U.S. what they had done for Iran and other countries.

The most telling proof of the CIA's transplanting of its foreign programs to the U.S. was the training of U.S. citizens at the CIA-controlled International Police Services, Inc.,

Office of Public Safety and International Police Academy (IPA) which were programs for foreign officials. According to a State Department document obtained through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request the following Americans attended the IPA: Jesus Jesus Cruz (6/2/72-9/29/72); Louis Moongog (1/24/74-5/24/74); Juan Garrido Roberto (6/3/72-7/24/72 -- Roberto also attended the CIA's bomb school then in Los Fresnos, Texas); Gregorio Sablan (1/24/74-5/24/74); John Stole (1/24/74-5/24/74); and Benny Santos Wuintugua (6/2/72-9/29/72).² Two Americans, both named Juan P. Ignacio attended the OPS at an unknown program and time period.

On December 11, 1967, two CIA officers, visited Conlisk, and John Mulchrone, then Deputy Superintendent. Accordingly, "First order of business was a discussion of the need to limit knowledge of the relationship between the Chicago Police Department and CIA, particularly in view of a recent wave of newspaper disclosures about the C.P.D.". It was then agreed that William J. Duffy, then Director of the Intelligence Division/CPD and Pierce J. Fleming, then Deputy Superintendent of the Bureau of Staff Services/CPD would be informed of the "CIA affiliation".

According to the CIA, their two emissaries were suppose to provide the CPD with assistance in "system analysis, filing, collation and the assessment of intelligence information". The CIA has not released the so-called "survey" of their two emissaries. However, an accompanying memo indicated the political nature of the visit as well as at least one CIA directive for a clandestine, extra-legal change by the CPD. Regarding the former, the memo stated that, "In addition, the team went on an evening drive-along with a Task Force car patrolling one of the city's trouble spots to get a feeling for the realities of reporting and controlling incidents in the slum areas."

The extra-legal activity "concerned the automation of special files on subversive groups and on organized crime..." The CIA team stated that

"these files are too sensitive to be incorporated in the CPD General Name Index which is, in effect, open to the public..."

In other words, there was a need to conceal these files because of their questionable legality. Rather than suggesting the cessation of these filings, the CIA team "recommended that CPD personnel come to Washington for a detailed briefing on a computer system which the Clandestine Services uses to collate and retrieve information on organizations..." In short, to hell with constitutional rights, just get a deeper cover for your operations.

The most glaring example of the CIA's takeover for politicization was seen in the cases of William J. Duffy and John Mulchrone. According to point 5 of the same CIA memo: "Another problem that the team noted is an uncertainty about the mission of the Intelligence Division. Director Duffy, by background and inclination, feels that his Division should be concentrating on long-range intelligence operations against organized crime. However, for the past two years, his assets have been pressed into service to gather tactical intelligence on civil disturbances. This problem was not discussed with Conlisk, but it was discussed with Mulchrone who is Duffy's superior."

Two months later Duffy was demoted from Director of the Intelligence Division to district watch commander.

John Mulchrone was another story. "He impressed the team as a rising star in the Department and a person well worth cultivating."

So much for systems analysis.

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In 1967, the same year the CIA began its training and equipment programs with the Prince George's (P.G.) County police, two county officers, Joseph D. Vasco and James Fitzpatrick, directed what the Washington Post called "Death Squad" operations.³ A subsequent investigation by the Maryland State Police⁴ directed by Corporals A. Wayne Cusimano and Francis L. Donaldson confirmed the occurrence of these "Death Squad" operations at the "instigation" of

Vasco and Fitzpatrick. Vasco, former acting chief of P.G. County; Fitzpatrick, now P.G.'s supervisor of police training; and retired Lt. Blair Montgomery, former head of the P.G.'s detective squad refused to take lie detector tests and were, according to the state police report, "for the most part, unable to recall many of the details". Involved police informants did, however, take lie detector tests, "and none has indicated deception in the opinion of the examiners".

According to the report, on June 8, 1967, a High's store at 9101 Riggs Road in Adelphi (MD) was held up by a police informant, Gregory Gibson, and two accomplices he had recruited at the instruction of Vasco. P.G. police were staked out at the High's in preparation for the robbery. They riddled with bullets the hold-up car, which they had obtained for Gibson, and killed 18-year-old William H. Mathews, Jr. of Takoma Park (MD). Vasco's role in this robbery amounted "to the actual planning of the robbery". Former P.G. detective, John R. Cicala told The Post that he had driven around with Gibson and Vasco selecting the store to be robbed.⁵

Five weeks later on July 13, 1967, Gibson who obviously knew of Vasco's involvement in the High's killing, was critically wounded by Vasco himself during an attempted burglary in College Park (MD). Gibson contends he was set up by another Vasco informant. Vasco's official report stated he had received an anonymous tip before the burglary. The State Police report found that Vasco knew the caller, Joe Bonds, "then under threat of arrest on an open warrant by Vasco unless he provided criminal information... Gregory Gibson was encouraged by Joe Bonds to break into a jewelry store". Furthermore, Ron Cook, a former P.G. detective who accompanied Vasco, testified that Vasco's report "did not reflect the incident as he now recalls it... (and he) was uncomfortable with what happened and remains so today".

The aforementioned John R. Cicala later refused to act as a store clerk for another staged robbery

planned for November 24, 1967 at a 7-Eleven store in Cheverly (MD). For his refusal, he was fired.⁶

Despite Cicala's refusal, the staged robbery did take place. A police informant, John Crowley, lured Pedro Gonzales into the robbery. Gonzales was wounded and subsequently sentenced to prison. According to Crowley, if he "had not been pressured (by Vasco and Fitzpatrick) into asking Gonzales to participate in this crime, neither he nor Gonzales would have done this crime".

On November 26, 1967, William C. Harris was killed by police during another staged robbery of a 7-Eleven store in Chillum (MD). David E. Wedler, another participant, was apprehended and subsequently sentenced to prison. Wedler insisted he had been encouraged by Sidney J. Hartman who turned out to be a police informant. Hartman told the State Police investigators that he had been recruited to arrange the robbery and procure participants by Vasco and Fitzpatrick in return for their help in quashing a public drunkenness charge that could have returned him to prison since he was then on parole.

The State Police investigation also found three other instances in which Vasco and Fitzpatrick allegedly "engineered crimes in order to allow the scenes to be staked out and the perpetrators arrested".

Prior to the State Police investigation, Prince George's County Executive Lawrence Hogan (a former FBI agent) and State's Attorney, Arthur A. Marshall, Jr. initiated an internal county investigation which they claimed disproved any police wrongdoing or the existence of a Death Squad.⁷ However, the State Police charged that there were "major discrepancies" between the county and State Police investigations. And, when Marshall received a copy of the State Police report he refused to release it to the public.⁸

When the State Police report was released, Hogan and Marshall -- as they did after the county investigation -- defended the police actions on the basis that standards for police behavior were different in 1967.⁹ Thus, police actions in 1967 should not be

judged against the standards of today.

Similarly, Vasco stated that: "I am still satisfied that what was done by members of this department in 1967 was proper at the time and not in violation of any federal, state or local laws. These actions must be evaluated in the proper context, and compared to the standards of 12 years ago."¹⁰ To this, the Washington Post editorialized: "However dim recollections of 1967 may be, the conduct described in the report was no more acceptable then than it is now."¹¹

Aside from the concurrent CIA training, there is no evidence of CIA involvement in the P.G.'s police death squad operations. They do, however, bear an unnerving similarity to death squad operations executed by CIA-controlled police in Latin America.

FOOTNOTES

1) The data on the CIA and the Chicago Police came from CIA documents released in discovery proceedings in the Alliance to End Repression, et.al.v.-James O'Grady, et.al. law suit. Copies of these documents are available from CounterSpy. All the quotations in the text are from these documents. Articles with excerpts from the documents, were also published in the Chicago Sun-Times (5/10/78) and the Washington Post (4/24/78).

2) "Report C190 - Accumulative Departures - Programs Completed", Report dated Dec. 1977, p.1

3) Meyer, Eugene L. and Feinstein, John "Probe Links P.G. Police To Holdups", Washington Post, 10/27/79, pp.A-1, A-11

4) Maryland State Police Report on Prince George's County Police, 1979. The facts and quotations in the text are from this report unless signified otherwise. A copy of the report is available from CounterSpy.

4) cf supra # 3

5) ibid.

6) ibid.

7) ibid.

8) ibid.

9) ibid.

10) ibid.

11) "The Prince George's Police Report" Washington Post, 10/29/79 (Unsigned editorial).

C.I.A. - MEDIA

The Church Committee, that is part of it, looked at the CIA's past relationship with the U.S. press and media. The committee did not interview, either in open or closed sessions, any reporters, editors, publishers, or broadcast executives involved with the CIA.

William B. Bader, who had come from the CIA, supervised and controlled the committee's inquiry.¹ Following his service with the committee, Bader returned to the CIA as a deputy to director Stansfield Turner. Bader was assisted by David Aaron who went on to join the intelligence community as a deputy to Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser.

Bader from the outset was opposed -- as was the CIA -- to naming journalists and media personnel who worked for the CIA.² -- thus continuing the pall over all journalists. He also believed that the CIA had not intentionally manipulated the U.S. press or media. As he said in the Church Report: "In pursuing its foreign intelligence mission the Central Intelligence Agency has used the U.S. media for both the collection of intelligence and cover." Moreover, Bader felt that the CIA had gone to great lengths to restrict domestic propagandizing as seen in the inclusion of William Colby's misleading statement in the Church Report: "We have taken particular caution to ensure that our operations are focused abroad and not at the United States in order (not) to influence the opinion of the American people about things from a CIA point of view."³ (This is the same William Colby who has been presenting the CIA point of view almost non-stop throughout the U.S. since his termination as CIA director.)

With Bader at the helm, so to speak, the committee agreed to the following CIA restrictions.⁴ Staff directors William Bader and William Miller would examine the sanitized CIA files of 25 (out of 400 journalist files) journalists which would not contain the journalists' names or their news organizations or involved CIA officers. Of these 25 files or past operations, Senators Church and Tower could examine

five which were unsanitized. Bader, Miller, Church, and Tower were sworn to secrecy regarding the contents of the files and could tell nobody about them not even the other members of the committee. Furthermore, the CIA gave the committee no information on its current relationship with the press and the media.

One committee member observed that: "From the CIA point of view this was the highest, most sensitive program of all... It was a much larger part of the operational system than has been indicated."⁵ (The Pike Committee also charged that the CIA's media and press operations constituted "the largest single category of covert action projects undertaken by the CIA".) That was about the extent of the committee's revelations. Bader never discussed his findings with the full committee, and he drafted the 11-page "Covert Relationship with the United States Media" section of the Church Report of which committee member Gary Hart stated "It hardly reflects what we found."⁶ Bader in a frank moment also observed that: "None of the important operations are affected in even a marginal way."⁷

One unidentified committee member pinpointed another role Bader served for the CIA since he had seen 400 summaries of CIA media and press files. To wit: "It was smart of the Agency to cooperate to the extent of showing the material to Bader (who showed it to nobody else). That way, if one day a file popped up, the Agency would be covered. They could say they had already informed the Congress."⁸

Bader has now been hired by Senator Church as staff director for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

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The CIA's use of the press was seen in the case of Charles Bartlett, a syndicated columnist who was given an internal ITT document on September 23, 1970⁹ written by CIA operatives Hal Hendrix and Robert Berrellez.¹⁰ This document exposed the on-going ITT/CIA plotting against Allende. It stated, in part, that the U.S. ambassador to Chile had received the "green light to move in the name of President Nixon... (with) maximum authority to do all

possible -- short of a Dominican Republic-type action -- to keep Allende from taking power".¹¹ Furthermore, the Chilean army "has been assured full material and financial assistance by the U.S. military establishment"¹² and ITT has "pledged (its financial) support if needed"¹³ to the anti-Allende forces.

Bartlett wrote a column on September 28, 1970 based on this document.¹⁴ But, rather than expose, and possibly stop, criminal ITT/CIA operations, he wrote that Chile was threatened by a "Classic communist-style assumption of power"¹⁵ about which there was little the U.S. could "profitably do"¹⁶ and besides "Chilean politics should be left to the Chileans".¹⁷

Obviously, the ITT official who gave Bartlett the document knew what he was doing. Bartlett's article not only failed to expose the CIA but also gave the impression that the U.S. was uninvolved -- which Bartlett knew was a lie.

FOOTNOTES

- 1) Bernstein, Carl, Rolling Stone, 10/20/1977 (see also: "Did Senate Panel Cover For CIA ?", Washington Star, 9/12/77; "Journalism Links to CIA Alleged", Christian Science Monitor, (UPI), 9/26/77; and Seib, Charles B. "The Press/Spy Affair : Cozy and Still Murky", Washington Post, 10/14/77)
- 2) Bernstein, Carl, Rolling Stone, 10/20/77
- 3) *ibid.* (as quoted by Bernstein)
- 4) *ibid.*
- 5) *ibid.*
- 6) *ibid.*
- 7) *ibid.*
- 8) *ibid.*
- 9) Marchetti, Victor and Marks, John The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1974, p.350
- 10) "U.S. Counter-Revolutionary Apparatus: The Chilean Offensive", NACLA, v.VIII, no.6, July-August 1974
- 11) *ibid.* (Memo, as quoted in NACLA)
- 12) *ibid.*
- 13) *ibid.*
- 14) Washington Post, 9/28/70
- 15) *ibid.*
- 16) *ibid.*
- 17) *ibid.*

C.I.A. - ACADEMIA

Harvard economist Arthur Smithies to Dean Franklin L. Ford (12/7/67):

"The Central Intelligence Agency has instructed its consultants to inform their official superiors of this connection with the Agency. I hereby inform you of my connection of 10 years duration. I wish I could add that there is something subtly interesting or sinister about it."

Ford to Smithies:

"Acknowledge. Should we have a confidential file on such relationships outside personal files?"

.....

The significance and direct connection between academicians and CIA covert operations were illustrated in the CIA's tracking of Che Guevara in Bolivia. CIA academicians often claim a distinction or separatedness between their work and "dirty tricks". As the following shows, there is no such separation.

Not long after his murder at the hands of the CIA, Albert Sugerman charged that "Military research carried on at the University of Michigan's Willow Run Laboratories was directly responsible for the capture and death of Che Guevara in Bolivia just over one year ago".¹

Sugerman's charge was directed at surveillance and reconnaissance technology and equipment developed at the University of Michigan. In a remark reminiscent of his fellow president John Hannah of Michigan State University, University of Michigan president, Harlan Hatcher made clear that the university knew the purpose and application of their research. To wit:

"The importance to national defense of some of the present and past research programs of the Willow Run staff, especially in reconnaissance and surveillance technology, was brought into sharper focus by the situation in Vietnam, where allied forces rely heavily upon aerial surveillance for military intelligence."²

Sugerman charged that it was this precise technology that the CIA and

the Green Berets used to track down Che. The man who helped develop this technology and equipment was George Zissis, then head of the Infrared Physics Laboratory at Willow Run.

Zissis was also fully cognizant of the intended use of his work since he was personally asked by the Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA-- which also works with the CIA) to come up with equipment to help the Royal Thai military to track down guerillas. Asked why ARPA approached him, Zissis replied: "We know what parts to order, what systems to design, how to build, how to interpret information, and what to watch for."³

The devices, developed by Zissis and his colleagues, measure, from a plane, the different temperatures radiating from objects on the ground. In effect, they photograph the heat produced on the ground below. With these photographs and the knowledge of what radiation temperatures emanate from the natural terrain, it is possible to identify human beings with their body temperature of 98.6°F.

Following his development of this equipment Zissis remarked:

"The Thais are using it to find communist guerilla activity. Then the Thai military can send in forces to capture the communist ringleaders... Generally, the Thais are doing a darn good job. We feel proud of our students."⁴

It is now well established that in 1967 the CIA and the Green Berets were assisting the Bolivian Rangers hunt Che and the guerillas fighting with him. There was even a "Che Watch" run by the CIA and the Pentagon. This consisted of people who studied military and CIA intelligence relating only to Che.

During the summer of 1967, Mark Hurd, Aerial Surveys, Inc., of Minneapolis, was to conduct aerial surveys of Bolivia for the Agency for International Development (AID) using techniques developed at University of Michigan's Willow Run lab. According to then Hurd vice-president, Dean Hanson: "The firm conducted aerial survey missions in the Rio Grande Valley area of Bolivia, where the

guerillas were known to be active during June-November, 1967.⁵ Hanson also said that infrared cameras had been used and that the films were given to AID -- which, of course, works hand-in-glove with the CIA.

Again, according to Sugerman, "It seems highly likely that the information on that film was interpreted by the Special Forces members trained by the University of Michigan scientists who were in Bolivia under CIA and Pentagon orders." ⁶

Whether or not one can attribute Che's capture and death to Zissis and the Willow Run staff, their conscious servicing of the operations in Vietnam and Thailand is a searing indictment of the CIA on campus and the academicians who serve the CIA.

Finally, it should be noted that the Army Math Research Center at the University of Wisconsin/Madison participated in 1967 in "Project Michigan" in the development of airborne sensors for the detection of guerillas operating in dense foliage. Despite being destroyed by a planted bomb, the Center continues and has received more than \$7 million in the last four and a half years for similar research.

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The CIA on campus was personified in Barnaby Conrad Keeney, president of Brown University from 1955-1966. Keeney attended Harvard University when "the same people controlled staffing for history departments and for the analysis division of the intelligence services.... Barney Keeney was roped into that network". In 1951 while dean of Brown's graduate school, Keeney took a leave of absence to work for the CIA. (The year before Joseph Sisco, who was to become president of American University, was working for the CIA.) For some unknown reason, Keeney apparently was skilled in developing CIA agents as he spent the year helping CIA officials design a training program for new CIA recruits, according to Lyman Kirkpatrick.⁸ Kirkpatrick, by the way, is a CIA/campus story himself. He is a former CIA executive-director who has been a political science professor at Brown since 1965.

Ray Cline, a former CIA deputy director of Intelligence, now esconced at Georgetown University, wrote about Kirkpatrick's going to Brown as if it were a CIA assignment. "One of this group, Lyman Kirkpatrick, has become a principal academic expositor of the organization and functions of U.S. intelligence. He left CIA in 1965 to take a position as professor at Brown University. In addition to teaching about the intelligence profession, he has written two solid books describing CIA and other intelligence agencies; The Real CIA (1968) and The Intelligence Community (1973)." ⁹

Returning to Keeney, in 1951 he did inform Brown that he was working for the CIA. However, he did not inform them that he continued working for the CIA upon his return to Brown and throughout his entire presidency. Interestingly, at the time of Keeney's appointment to the presidency in 1955, Kirkpatrick, at the time CIA Inspector General, wrote that "Naturally, I hope that the best of Brown will be encouraged to make intelligence a career".¹⁰

Under Keeney, Brown faculty members received CIA requests for references for students unaware of being checked by the CIA. Obviously, Keeney secretly provided Brown as a deep CIA labor pool.

Keeney has now admitted his CIA employment and that he was advising the CIA on ways of setting up covert funding procedures which he claimed were necessary to cover the CIA's presence from "enemy nations".¹¹ A 1957 Kirkpatrick memo indicates otherwise. The CIA was, in fact, hiding their researchers from their colleagues who might have viewed the CIA work as "unethical and... (bordering) on the illegal".

A later CIA memo reconfirmed that the CIA intent was to hide their academicians from their colleagues and not "enemy nations". Another CIA report from its Inspector General, written a year after Keeney's participation, observed: "a. Research in the manipulation of human behavior is considered by many authorities in medicine and related fields to be professionally unethical, therefore the reputation of professional participants in MKULTRA program are on occasion in jeopardy.."

New Times magazine had also discovered that in 1962 Keeney became chairperson of the Human Ecology Fund, a front for the CIA's domestic operation MKULTRA. Keeney, like the CIA, claims the drug research was defense-oriented. Internal CIA documents indicate the drug research had early on developed offensive objectives.

One was "to get control of an individual to the point where he will do our biddings against his will and even against such fundamental laws of human nature as self-preservation". Frank Olson was an unwitting American subject of CIA's LSD experimentation who committed suicide during the testing period.

In fall 1977, the CIA notified 44 colleges and universities that MKULTRA research had been conducted at their campuses. The CIA did not inform Brown of Keeney's work for the Human Ecology Fund or any other aspect of his CIA work while at Brown. When Brown's current president, Howard Swearer was told of Keeney's involvement he was nonplussed. He observed: "Given the fragmentary nature of the information which the CIA provides, it probably doesn't matter much that we weren't informed." He refused to elaborate.¹²

FOOTNOTES

- 1) Sugerman, Albert G.: "Michigan, Che and the CIA", New Republic, 10/9/68, pp.9-10
- 2) *ibid.* As quoted by Sugerman
- 3) *ibid.* As quoted by Sugerman
- 4) *ibid.*
- 5) *ibid.*
- 6) *ibid.*
- 7) Sommer, Andrew and Cheshire, Marc "The Spy Who Came In From The Campus" New Times, 10/30/78, p.14
- 8) *ibid.*
- 9) Cline, Ray Secrets, Spies and Scholars, Acropolis Books, Washington D.C., 1976, p.194
- 10) New Times, cf supra # 7
- 11) *ibid.*
- 12) *ibid.*

From the Editors

The response to our last issue was overwhelming. We would like to thank all our readers who have written expressing their solidarity and/or their criticism, and have supported us financially with contributions and subscription renewals. Our financial situation has improved - however, not yet to the point of being "satisfactory". Therefore, we need your continued contributions, as well as your feedback.

COMING UP

In the next issue we will feature an article on U.S. involvement in Thailand, by Robin Broad of Princeton University, and an analysis of the explosive situation in Turkey - focusing on U.S. and NATO attempts to keep Turkey in the pro-capitalist, pro-western sphere.

Other articles will examine U.S. support for Morocco's King Hassan in his war against the Polisario liberation movement, by Akyaba Addai-Sebo, and U.S. governmental propaganda operations overseas, using AID-funded radio programs in Columbia as a case study. CounterSpy will also print a response from TransAfrica to a Washington Post article quoted in our last issue.

A fifth article will provide background on the British intelligence agencies MI-5 and MI-6 which rocketed into headlines recently with the unprecedented publication of the names of their directors. (Names revealed included Howard Smith, Director General of MI-5, who has served in Moscow, Northern Ireland, and in the Cabinet Office; Arthur Franks, Director General of MI-6 who has been previously identified as a Counsellor at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; and one MI-6 officer, Hamilton McMillan, who has served in Austria and Italy.)

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The Africa Research & Publications Project is a coalition (a working group) of African activists. Its objective is to promote a democratic dialogue among Africans and their friends on vital issues and problems facing African peoples.

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Write to ARPP regarding their publications and more information.

An organization working on East Timor in the U.S. is the Emergency Committee for Human Rights in Indonesia and Self-Determination in East Timor (P.O. Box 27, Thurston Courts Apts., Ithaca, NY 14852). Write them for more information.

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"I wonder where they get their money", asked CIA Director Stansfield Turner about CounterSpy in a February 1979 Time magazine article.

That's a good question. As a matter of fact; those of us on CounterSpy staff often wonder where the money will be coming from as financial problems continue to plague our work.

There is a need for a magazine like CounterSpy. It is necessary to uncover and analyze the "activities" of U.S. intelligence agencies around the world. And, as simplistic as it might sound, a subscription or contribution to CounterSpy is a way of supporting that work. We depend solely on the subscriptions and contributions of our readers.

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